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Abstract 
In continuation of what has been said in the first part of this two-part paper, herein we 
present further considerations on symbolism, reconsider some related psychodynamic 
case reports with some possible variants about their interpretations, and will apply what is 
said to some further speculations on mathematical symbolism and thought. In this second 
part, we continue with the numeration of the first part Σύµβολου, 1. 
 
 
Introduction 
On symbolism: further considerations 
On sign and symbol. Following Harré, Lamb and Mecacci (1983), in psychology, a sign 
is considered to have a symbolic nature when we are not interested in its referential 
meaning but, rather, in the content borne by it, whose communicative aim, being a 
psychological factor, could be unconscious. In the psychological context, the symbol 
should be considered in a different manner to the sign, and the content should be 
considered in a different way to the referent, the latter being correlated to the sign 
through the reference relationship, whereas the content is correlated to the symbol 
through the unconscious component of the former. All that is in agreement with the 
Jungian theory of symbolism according to which reference and use of signs of direct 
thought should be ascribed to the action of conscious thought, whereas symbols should be 
attributed to the joint and inseparable action of conscious and unconscious thought. 
Moreover, according to these authors, there is a strict connection between the symbolic 
usage of signs and altered states of consciousness, the latter being seen as more desirable 
because they allow us to bypass the ordinary vigil (often unpleasant and anxiogenic 
organization of the Ego. These are often identified, in early adolescence (puberty), as 
initial psychotic events,2 in alternation with the first normal phases of reasoning, 
abstraction and hypothesis-making abilities, together with the formation of first feelings 
of empathy and Ego’s decentralization. And all this is in accordance with what has been 
said above about Ego’s splitting. Following Galimberti (2006), Freud himself 
distinguished between sign and symbol, the former being understood as indicating a more 
or less direct presence of something, while the latter refers to something which, in turn, 
may refer to another something achieved only by means of an interpretation. As stated 
above, displacement and condensation are the main mechanisms through which the 
                                                
1 Correspondence  concerning  this  article  should  be  addressed  to  Giuseppe Iurato,  Department  of  Physics  and  Department  of  Mathematics  and  Computer Science, University of Palermo, Palermo, Italy, E‐mail: giuseppe.iurato@unipa.it 2  According  to  Mastrangelo  (1975),  the  presence  of  psychoses  in  childhood  is nowadays a matter of fact. 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primary process acts. In the first of these,3 the part represents the whole or vice versa, or 
rather a given idea, object or image is instinctually replaced by another effectively 
associated with it, even if with modalities that are often not logical. On the other hand, in 
the second one,4 there is convergence and merging of the drive’s cathexes related to 
different objects or aims. According to Lalli (1993), metaphor and metonymy are the 
main mechanisms of symbolic activity; at the basis of metaphor, then, lie associations by 
similitude and analogy. Further, metaphor denotes a thing which is different from the 
named one, transferring the concept that this thing means out of its usual or normal 
meaning. Instead, metonymy, in naming a thing or a concept, makes a displacement on 
the basis of a conceptual relationship. In doing so, the effect is named for the cause, the 
possessor for the possessed thing, the producer for the product, and, above all, the 
abstract for the concrete.5 Finally, due to the replacement of a total object with a partial 
one, in fetishism there is the tendency to replace a part with the whole, albeit the inter-
individual relationship is kept, and this principle of the method, as already said, might be, 
in some respects, compared with the inductive method. On the other hand, following 
Piscicelli (1994), the displacement of a desire upon a generic image is one of the main 
semantic mechanisms of signification widely involved in symbolic formation. Through 
fetish formation, the transfer of the Ego upon the object fetish takes place in degenerative 
cases, or upon symbolic formations in normal cases (see also above Khan Masud’s ideas 
on perversions).  
 
Again on symbolism  
Following Rogers (1978), the consideration of language in relation to primary and 
secondary psychic processes requires a rethinking of the theory of symbolism. For 
instance, to rectify that sort of one-sidedness of symbolism (as in the 1916 Ernest Jones 
work on the theory of symbolism), Rycroft (1968b) argues against this unilateral view 
that sexual symbolism belongs solely to the primary process and occurs only by virtue of 
repression, in dreams. Rycroft (1968a, 1968b) and Beres (1950) instead assume 
symbolism to be a general ability of mind which is based on perception and which may 
be used both by the primary process and by the secondary process. According to Rogers 
(1978), a literary symbol or a piece of symbolic behaviour can, and often will, reflect 
both primary and secondary processes functioning simultaneously, analogously to the 
action of a bi-logical process as formulated by I. Matte Blanco (see Iurato, 2013). 
Symbolism is a ubiquitous process present in all human activity. Following Petocz 
(2004), amongst the diversity of meanings of symbol, Whitehead (1927, p. 60) 
highlighted the mystical character that it had, commenting on “a certain unstable mixture 
of attraction and repulsion” in our attitude towards symbolism. He states that symbolism, 
from sense presentation to physical bodies, is the most natural and widespread of all 
symbolic modes. Langer (1942) states that symbolization is the essential act of thought: 
the symbol-making function is one of man’s primary activities, like eating, looking, or 
moving about. It is the fundamental process of mind, and goes on all the time. The human 
brain function is constantly carrying out a process of symbolic transformation of 
experimental data that have come to it. The symbolization is the most natural outcome of 
how the human mind has transformed that primary need to express oneself. 
 
                                                3 See Solomon & Patch (1971). 4 See Arieti (1969), especially Volume III as regards creativity. 5 This last displacement is of fundamental importance for symbolic function. 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A comparison with autism and a phylogenetic view  
The relationships between creative thought and the spectrum of psychotic disorders have 
been known since Freud’s work. For instance, many valuable studies have been pursued 
in this direction and, in this regard, the communication of Carapezza and Cuccio (2010) 
is a good essay on the chief studies (see references therein6) concerning some aspects of 
the creative abilities of individuals who are shown to have Autistic Spectrum Disorders7 
(ASDs). For instance, it turns out that many subjects with ASDs have a peculiar 
characteristic, called weak central coherence, which means that such subjects have a 
preference for details without being able to lay out them into a coherent and unitary 
frame.8 It seems that such a strong preference for and attention to details are also typical 
characteristics of creative thought, which, in turn, would derive both from a sensorial 
hypersensibility and from a certain tendency towards a hypersystematization thanks to 
which they are able to identify structural regularities and symmetries. On the other hand, 
these last considerations might have certain common points with what we have already 
said above if one considers the disavowal mechanism as strictly correlated with a sort of 
search for a penis where it is missing, seen therefore as a tendency towards an anatomic 
detail as well as the result of a lack of regularity which stems from a comparative 
examination of sexual gender differences. What is said above regarding non-adult 
subjects with , who also have an uncommonly high intellectual level,9 could be 
interpreted as the extreme outcome of a drastic and emotively poorly managed splitting of 
the Ego which, nevertheless, does not degenerate into paraphilia because of a 
hypersymbolization as compensation for fetishistic tendencies. From a phylogenetic 
viewpoint, symbolism embeds its roots in the mists of time. Indeed, symbols seem to be a 
psychic legacy dating back to the archaic origins of human beings. The history of 
religions, folklores and mythologies provides interesting sources connected to the first 
primitive initiation rites: in this regard, see Ferrero (1995), Marchesini (1901), Valeri 
(1979), Màdera (1977) and Eliade (1976). In particular, very close relationships exist 
between totemism and fetishism; in this regard see Eliade (1976), Abraham (1978) and 
Casonato (1992). Furthermore, fetishism also has deep historical roots in ethnic-social-
anthropological and linguistic contexts, from which it has gradually earned its pre-
                                                6 See, above all,  the main researches made by Baron‐Cohen, Ashwin, Tavassoli and Chakrabati (2009), Frith (1989) and Happé and Vital (2009). 7  This  spectrum  has  a  non‐empty  intersection  with  the  spectrum  of  psychotic disorders  (   as  Psychotic  Spectrum  Disorders):  for  instance,  introversion  and deficiency of social relationships are elements of   8 And this seems analogous to the fragmentary and disjointed corporal image which fetishists have.  9 Following Mastrangelo (1975), this is one of the features of infantile schizophrenia, together  with  a  phobic  symptomatology  and  a  loss  of  relations  with  the environment. From the psychodynamic viewpoint, the transitional (Winnicott) and persecutory  (Klein)  object  phenomenologies  are  also  invoked  to  explain  certain damages to the object relationships involved in these disorders. Furthermore, until six years old, subjects with   are unable to distinguish the meanings of personal pronouns  in  relation  to others,  because  he  or  she  has  a  severe  impairment  of  the own  identity  perception  in  respect  to  the  otherness.  The  only  means  thanks  to which  they  establish  relations  are  exclusively  toys  and  not words. Hence,  they  do not develop an albeit minimal separation between I and not‐I, that is to say, they do not recognize the otherness. 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eminent symbolic function during the course of history. However, the sources of 
fetishism confirm the essential intermediary nature of the fetish (hence, of the phallus) 
between humans and (divine) nature. Furthermore, according to the ethnoanthropological 
research, fetishism is not venerated because it is considered to be the place or the abode 
of the divinity but rather for the protection that one expects to have (hence to avoid an 
anxiety feeling). The symbol draws its origins from religious symbolism10 as a 
prolongation of the dialectic of the so-called hierophanies (or theophanies). A 
hierophany is something which manifests the sacred like myths, rites, cults and so on, 
through which heterogeneous plans and apparently irreducible realities are identified, 
assimilated and unified. Just from these historical bases come the origins of symbolism 
according to C.G. Jung, in which the concept of psychoid (which is a particular psychotic 
attributive dimension that should be meant from a well-defined phylo-ontogenetic 
sense11) plays a fundamental role.12 The fetish is then represented as one of the first 
coarse forms of religion, according to Musatti (1977), hence an intermediary between the 
human being and the otherness. In this last sense, taking into account what was just said 
about fetishism, religion, mythology and initiation rites,13 it is not possible to leave aside 
the work of Thomas Mann and his Moon-grammar (see Sweet, 1982; McDonald, 1999). 
This author, starting from the ancient Egyptian, Mesopotamian and Assyric-Babylonian 
mythologies to Revealed Sacredness, in his 1943 four-part novel Joseph and His 
Brothers, amongst other things argues on the possible origins of the common conscious 
language of ancient Near East people from initiation rites of a fetishistic nature, which 
have then been acquired by other religious doctrines. Mann distinguishes between a 
Daylight-grammar and a Moon-grammar, through which the spirits communicate with 
human beings, coherently with that intermediary role played by fetish mentioned above. 
The first has an exoteric character and is quite familiar to us in the form of Scriptures, 
traditions, events, worships, and so on. The second has instead an esoteric nature and 
regards small groups, prayer, silence, meditation, even dreams, and is called by E. Fromm 
“God’s forgotten language” (see Fromm, 1951). Some have argued that the first special 
gift of the Holy Spirit in the Bible was Joseph’s ability to interpret dreams, so that we 
have a very coarse precursor of the next Freudian dream interpretation. Finally, an 
interesting study on the influences of religious-mystical and psychotic experiences (like 
those of altered consciousness states) on the primary process of language, emotion and 
body boundary imagery, in the wake of what was just said above in relation to 
phylogenetic aspects of fetishism (and other aspects, like those related to transitional 
phenomena), has been made by Cariola (2012).   
 
On mathematical symbolism, creativity and other 
On mathematical symbolism. There have been several authors who have treated the 
relationships between exact and natural sciences and psychoanalysis: amongst them,14 C. 
G. Jung, C. A. Meier, W. Pauli, I. Matte Blanco, E. Von Domarus, S. Ferenczi, I. 
Hermann, J. Lacan, M. Klein and W. R. Bion. According to Canestri and Oliva (1991), 
                                                10 See Ferrero (1895) and Eliade (1976). 11 For the notions of phylogeny and ontogeny and their possible relationships from a psychological  viewpoint,  see,  for  example,  Gould  (1977),  Fossi  (1983,  1984), Piscicelli (1994) and Petocz (2004).  12 See La Forgia (1991). 13 For these, see Piscicelli (1994). 14 See also Rosen (1954, p. 139) for further references. 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who analysed the inhibitions in second degree school mathematics, it is possible to speak 
of a certain “mathematical anxiety” felt by those who use mathematical formulas, like 
 for every  and , which refers to a kind of trauma 
due to the emotive impact with something whose existence, that is the meaning of the 
formula, is misunderstood; and this, notwithstanding the fact that they showed a certain 
desire towards mathematics. To find such a meaning, the student is forced to compare 
herself or himself with an “exterior”, that is the mathematical reality, which has its 
specific meaningful organizations. For her or him, such a meaning hasn’t been 
symbolically included into the formulas but rather it has fully and defensively taken the 
place of the formula itself. Thus, we descry certain analogies with aspects of disavowal. 
In their important paper, Canestri and Oliva (1991) also analysed some youngsters 
suffering from disorders belonging to , detecting a common 
feature, that is to say, their inability to make suitable links and connections, as well as to 
integrate the various senses, the latter being a characteristic identified by D. Meltzer in 
his studies on autism. The authors, in analysing their case studies, observed as the usual 
processes followed in solving more or less correctly certain mathematical questions were 
characterized by sequentiality and continuity laws in turn inferred by perceptive rules. If 
one asks them the rationale behind  these procedures, they are unable to give a correct 
answer: simply, for them, an algebraic equation is true or false depending on whether 
they consider a mathematical formula as a concrete indivisible object (we say, the 
missing female penis). Canestri and Oliva hence observe that this fact seems to refer to 
the H. Segal symbolic equation of psychotic thought that has been recalled in the first part 
of this paper. Canestri and Oliva repeatedly refer toof cases in which the students feel 
inadequacy, shame and guilt senses in front of the question of establishing the truth or 
falsity of an algebraic equation. It is as if the notion of “equation with its resolution” was 
deposited or stored in some part of the mind (unconscious) and is re-evocable only by 
means of well-determined perceptive stimuli. In learning mathematics, it is necessary to 
refrain from the sensual gratification provided by sensorial perception. The mental 
operations of abstraction and formalization impose the abandonment of the known and 
concrete for the unknown and abstract, thus entailing a certain tolerance of the lack of the 
object (we again say, of the female penis). The authors refer to having the impression that 
many students do not endure such a sensorial deprivation, trying immediately to rebuild 
up the lost concrete object but not according to a right mental elaboration as above 
recalled. They immediately follow the known and well-established rules and 
institutionalized practices, without being able to autonomously and originally create new 
connections, possible analogies, comparisons and relationships, above all in the face of a 
new and complex problem. In conclusion, at the basis of these learning mathematics 
problems, Canestri and Oliva hypothesize a disorder of the symbolic function very 
similar to that involved in psychotic disorders: in coping with a mathematical task 
requiring a high symbolic performance, many students feel an unmanageable mental pain 
that triggers a specific defence mechanism (we say, the disavowal one) that avoids the 
pain with the construction of a new surrogating reality which is plausible at the 
perceptive level but misunderstands the true reality, that is to say, the existence of the 
meaning of mathematical formulas. What was said by these authors is clearly coherently 
placeable within the framework here outlined and based on the disavowal mechanism. 
Again, the authors affirm that the various possible solutions and strategies adopted by 
students to overcome this mathematical pain sometimes have a “psychotic” nature, other 
times a “ neurotic” nature. According to them, this “mental pain”, felt in the face of an 
abstract reasoning, seems to be quite widespread. Canestri and Oliva try to explain these 
facts through different psychodynamic models, including the Freudian one based on 
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Mourning and Melancholia (of 1917) related to the loss of a loved object and the 
consequent pain. Nevertheless, in reference to Freud’s work, they do not make any 
allusion to disavowal. Thereafter, they quote the fundamental work of Melanie Klein, 
who considered symbolism to be at the root of every creative process. She brings back 
symbolization disorders to persecutory anxieties regarding sexual fantasies related to 
primary scenes. Connected with the Kleinian thought is that of H. Segal, the main traits 
of which we have outlined in the first part. Then, W. R. Bion (1962, 1963, 1967) brings 
back learning obstacles to difficulties of the relationship between mother and child. In 
Bion (1967), the author states that the mathematical objects arise from certain duplicity 
relations: for instance, the number two of breasts, the two eyes, the two feet, etc., and this 
is coherent with the anthropomorphic origins of certain elementary mathematical notions. 
On the other hand, the above-mentioned Bion’s notion of duplicity relation is, in many 
respects, similar to that of Hermann15 (1989) and named dual procedure, about which we 
shall briefly speak in the next sections. According to Bion, the right mental predisposition 
for doing mathematics is the result of an overcoming of the state of frustration (for the 
object’s loss) ruled by the sufferance and endurance which will lead to psychic 
modification and elaboration of secondary thought, whereas its intolerance will bring to a 
rapid behaviour of escape marked by the destructivity of reality data and impossibility of 
reflection. Bion (1962, 1967) makes interesting comparisons between the psychoanalytic 
interpretation and the insights that take place in science following what Poincaré said in 
this regard in his famous 1914 Science and Method. Bion makes frequent use of 
epistemological and mathematical considerations in his work, for instance, in relation to a 
notable epistemological consideration of Poincaré about the origins of a new 
mathematical result. To be precise, according to Poincaré, a mathematical result must join 
together already known elements which were previously disjoined and apparently 
unrelated amongst them; this combination will be made in such a manner as to establish 
order where was there apparent disorder. So, we are suddenly aware of the right place 
that every single piece must be within their complex set. Like our senses, so our mind 
would be frail and astray if wasn’t there  harmony in such a set; as in myopia, similarly 
our mind would see only the near details which would be at once forgotten as soon as it 
turned towards the farthest if there weren’t ordering capacity. The only facts which 
deserve attention are therefore those bringing order to this complex set, thus making it 
approachable. This is what Poincaré says and that it can hardly be contested. 
Furthermore, if one briefly looks at the foundations of Gestalt psychology, it is easy to 
descry, in the above Poincaré considerations, the bases of a paradigmatic shift as occurs 
in the Kuhnian scientific revolution theory. On the other hand, from what will be said in 
what follows, this Poincaré frame might also be brought back to the complex formation 
of bodily image, while Bion, instead, tries to put an analogy between this Poincaré 
synthesis and the Kleinian transition from a paranoid-schizoid position to a depressive 
one. Bion moreover states that the possible relations which will link together the elements 
of the above-mentioned complex set quoted by Poincaré are mainly carried out through 
unconscious processes which, in turn, operate by means of the so-called alpha functions 
whose main role is to organize the various sensorial and emotive elements of the 
perceptive field, providing relations and connections amongst them in such a manner as 
to structurate this field (the Gestalt). Thanks to this alpha function, when normally 
                                                
15 The original notion dates back  to 1924.  Imre Hermann (1899‐1984) was one of the main Hungarian psychoanalysts, a pupil of S. Ferenczi and M. Klein, who carried out remarkable studies on the psychoanalytic  foundations of rational  thought. The thought of this author has still been little considered by the history of psychology. 
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operating, it will be possible to establish relationships between external and internal 
reality. The mother will be the first primary object whose mature alpha function will 
mould that of the child and that will allow the unpleasant feelings, including the absence 
of the primary object, to be overcome. When this alpha function fails, a thought 
disturbance takes place with the presence of an “object that misunderstands” which 
belongs to the wider class of the so-called beta elements. According to Bion, the primary 
object would be the breast which, when it is absent, will be considered as a separated and 
deanimated partial object. This Bionian deanimation, meant to be a defence mechanism 
in coping with the unpleasantness of the absence of the animated object (that is, the 
animated breast joined to the mother body), would give rise to abstract and formal 
thought. According to Canestri and Oliva (1991), this deanimation might be meant as an 
unaware splitting between the meaning (semantics) and the abstract formula (syntax) that 
represent it. Therefore, the epistemophilic instinct,16 which is, roughly speaking, curiosity 
about the object, will be suppressed and replaced by a simple mechanical manipulation of 
the forms and relations considered as things in themselves, used as such and split from 
their meaning. The normality is mainly ruled by a correct inter-relationship between 
semantics and syntax through pragmatics: for instance, in schizophrenia, the fundamental 
action of the latter fails to integrate the first two (see Falzone, 2004) which remain 
unrelated. Following Bionian thought, Canestri and Oliva (1991) state that a bad outcome 
of this splitting as well as a defective functioning of the alpha function are at the root of 
many errors and much misunderstanding in mathematics. On the basis of this, we add 
what follows, namely that the Freudian epistemophilic drive performs a primary splitting 
between semantics and syntax in the following sense: when the primary object is 
perceptively absent, then, to avoid the consequent loss anxiety, the individual 
ontologically tries to re-evoke it. To do so, there are two possible ways, one consisting in 
immediately finding some material surrogate of it (with possible degenerations into 
paraphilia), and the other consisting in symbolically thinking about it. This last way will 
lead to the ontic identification17 (or definition) of that entity which will replace such an 
object with the formation of the related semantic and syntactic components of it. Further 
relationships between the syntactic and the semantic structures, ruled by pragmatics, will 
turn out to be of fundamental importance above all for the reality test. Canestri and Oliva 
(1991) pointed out that concrete and perceptive elements prevail in symbolic thought. 
They say that often there is an increase of physical exuberance and restlessness used as a 
primitive muscular defence toward mental stimuli lived as concrete objects. Mathematical 
corrections and attempts to establish connections or relationships are associated with 
                                                16 Following Bott Spillius, Milton, Garvey, Couve and Steiner (2011) and Galimberti (2006),  the  epistemophilic  instinct  is,  for  Freud,  a  part‐instinct,  which  is  a  part  of libido concerning voyeurism and exhibitionism, as a prolongation of sexual curiosity or  meant  as  sublimation  of  oral  drive.  It  becomes  a  central  instinct  in  Kleinian thought where it is seen as exploratory and necessary but also inevitably aggressive, involving phantasies of getting  inside the mother to  find and often to take over or destroy  the  riches  within  –  notably  mother’s  babies  and  father’s  penis.  The inevitable fear of retaliation may then inhibit curiosity and the capacity for learning. Within Kleinian work,  such an  epistemophilic  instinct plays  a  fundamental  role  in symbol formation and in general learning, thanks to the sexual curiosity upon which they  rely.  See  Bott  Spillius  et  al.  (2011)  for  further  interesting  information  on symbolism from S. Freud to M. Klein and H. Segal.  17 In the sense of Heidegger’s ontological difference between ontological truth and 
ontic truth. Every definition of each entity is always at the ontic level. 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unpleasant sensations of a persecutory type. Each student lives this as he or she had 
generically made “something evil” whose bad sensations hinder every improvement. 
Following Bion, the learning seems hindered by the presence of beta elements instead of 
alpha elements. We remember that, according to Bion, mathematical objects are the 
outcomes of the action of alpha function upon sensorial and perceptive impressions, 
while the action of beta function provides reality elements charged by persecutory and 
unpleasant features. In such a manner, the Bionian thought on mathematics is, in many 
respects, a forerunner of embodied mathematics. The concrete, imitative and greatly 
repetitive aspects of the wrong procedures adopted in solving mathematical questions 
often have the hallucinatory function of reproducing the lost object without taking into 
account its absence, that is, there is an incomplete elaboration of the object lack. 
According to Canestri and Oliva, these mathematical errors and misunderstandings are 
mainly due to a bad formation of the Gestalt as, for example, provided by the Meltzerian 
notion of “disassembly of senses” whose main result would be just this lack of Gestalt. 
These authors say too that this last state is not only typical of subjects having  or 
 but is the outcome of a mechanism susceptible to being active also in the absence 
of a specific pathology but when the performance of high abstraction tasks is required, 
and this corroborates what is expected by us in considering disavowal a general psychic 
mechanism according to Laplanche and Pontalis (1973). Again according to Canestri and 
Oliva, the great number of mathematical rules for signs, brackets, operations and so on 
needed for a correct development and resolution of a mathematical expression, if not well 
organized according to a form semantically and syntactically correct, will act on the mind 
like a disorganized realm of undifferentiated, undistinguishable and meaningless stimuli. 
On the other hand, the epistemological structure of physics just relies on a particular and 
complex relational net between syntactic and semantic structures linked together through 
certain correspondence rules having an operational character (see (Morgan & Morrison, 
1999)) which we would like to hypothesize is moulded on the basis of the above pattern 
of formation of the syntax and semantic primary structures. 
 
Further notes on mathematical symbolism  
Later on, Canestri and Oliva (1991) re-present their considerations in the light of H. 
Segal’s work on symbolism whose main lines were outlined in the first part of this paper. 
In discussing his thought, we have referred to a meaningful clinical case in which a 
schizophrenic patient identified a violin with his penis. This means that he found some 
element common both to the violin and the penis which has obscured all the others that 
made these two entities distinct, thus passing to an identification of the whole only on the 
basis of this primary common element. For instance, such a common element might be 
the geometric or material – hence perceptive – analogy of form between them, which 
prevails over all the other possible discriminating elements.18 Therefore, from a 
perceptive element of equality, the schizophrenic patient has passed to an identification of 
meaning of the two actions, namely playing a violin and masturbation, thus ignoring 
every minimal pragmatic contextuality. There is, in short, a substantial lack of abstract 
elaboration. This is the main feature that identifies, in a given social-cultural context, a 
                                                18  This  is  also  coherent  with  what  reported  in  (Iurato  2013)  where  has  been discussed  the  basilar  fact  that  a  schizophrenic  patient mainly  use  symmetric  and generalized principles in her or his reasoning, this implying, in turn, an impossibility to conceive the notion of power set. 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psychotic disorder that, nevertheless, may be considered with a certain degree of 
acceptability in some social-cultural contexts and, above all, in children. In fact, the latter 
often identify the name with the (named) thing: for instance, for the child, the name 
“father” coincides only with her or his physical personal father, i.e. the child is unable to 
consider the name “father” as having something to do with the relational structure of 
human society, hence of interpersonal nature.19 In this regard, Canestri and Oliva refer to 
an analogous case which takes place in consideration of the formula  which is 
directly equated with  instead to give rise to the latter through detailed 
calculations starting from the former,20 thereby ignoring the deep relational structure 
existing between these two entities. These modes of reasoning are coming back to slight 
forms of a psychotic mechanism that these authors would consider to be present in every 
human being but not in a psychopathological manner;21 and this is also in line with I. 
Matte Blanco’s bi-logical process theory. Canestri and Oliva say that such types of 
mathematical errors are mainly due to wrong thought modalities which resemble 
psychotic ones. And this is a further confirmation of our main hypothesis of this paper, 
i.e. to put the disavowal mechanism at the primary basis of abstract thought as well as a 
general psychic mechanism. Furthermore, the basic work of Canestri and Oliva (1991), 
besides confirming many points raised in this paper, makes a comparison with other 
psychological perspectives, such as the cognitive one, highlighting many common points 
with the psychoanalytic standpoint. In particular, the cognitive perspective also points out 
the action of certain defence mechanisms to avoid painful stimuli, including the so-called 
cognitive avoidance proposed by M. H. Erdelyi (1985). Retaking into account what is 
said above, the paper of Canestri and Oliva above all stresses a possible similar psychotic 
mechanism implying a lost object-induced splitting thanks to which it will be possible to 
give rise to semantic and syntactic structures of abstract thought. Their line of thought is 
very similar to the one followed in this paper and is based on disavowal mechanisms as 
well as being coherent with what will be said later about the relations with the bodily 
image formation. As further confirmation of this pursued line of thought, we report the 
main points delineated in the very interesting paper by V. H. Rosen (1954). First of all, he 
states that the concept of number normally arises in connection with certain stages of the 
maturation of the perception apparatus during the Œdipal period, and this, as well as what 
will be said, is of fundamental importance for the main arguments that we want to claim 
here. Indeed, the author goes on to say that in those with a special mathematical gift, it is 
probable that this maturational sequence takes place at an earlier period in Ego 
development so that along with the precocious concepts of number and quantity there 
remain certain archaic Ego defence mechanisms (amongst which we would want to 
include disavowal) which are later utilized in creative aspects of the (mathematical) 
process. A large part of the ordinary process of mathematical thought in these gifted 
individuals is preconscious and utilizes a capacity for decathexis of the conscious 
perceptual system. The “illumination” experience is a creative act, as is inspiration in 
other fields, and utilizes the Ego’s capacity for controlled regression to unformalized 
infantile modes of perceiving space and number. It is a highly overdetermined psychic 
                                                19 In this sense, a connection with C. Lévi‐Strauss’s structural anthropology theory is possible, above all with his assumption according to which the Œdipus complex  is the  cornerstone  of  the  passage  from  nature  to  culture,  providing  the  notion  of relational structure. This is in coherence with what said in this paper.  20 In this regard, see also what is said in Iurato (2013). 21  Which  requires  a  certain  repeated  and  systematic  presence  in  the  time  to  be defined as such (see DSM‐V options). 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event which involves all three structural systems as well as the subject’s historical 
individuality. Rosen reports the clinical data of a case study relating to a mathematician 
with suspected latent psychosis. This is a patient who has been a very sensitive child 
since early infancy, showing an extreme intolerance of loud noise and brightness 
(photophobia). Rosen (1954) also reports a series of dreams of the patient. In the first 
one, he says: “I am lying on a bed in a darkened room with a window at one end of it 
which is lit as if from the street. I am considering whether I should masturbate. Suddenly 
from behind the drape next to the window, I see a silhouette against the light, the figure 
of my father” (p. 130). 
 
The patient refers to having suffered pavor nocturnus around the age of four of five. On 
many occasions, when he was about five years of age, he was suddenly no longer allowed 
to stay in his mother’s bed and the night terrors disappeared shortly after this. Rosen 
interprets all this by bringing back it to scoptophilic primal scene interests with special 
reference to his father’s erection (the silhouette); hence, the light from the street and the 
window to direct primal scene curiosity and its replacement by curiosity in the 
intellectual sphere. This latter is suggested in the reference to the delay in instinctual 
gratification: “I am considering whether I should masturbate” (p. 130). The dream 
appears to refer therefore to the process of sublimation and the turning of the night light 
of the pavor nocturnus into intellectual light. Thereafter, the following two dreams were 
recounted (p. 134): 
 
I am sitting on the floor and see a snapping turtle through a crack in the door of a 
room. It is my job to keep the turtle in the room, but it seemed to force its way out 
despite my vigilance” and “I see a small “e” to the “x” power times an equation. I 
realize that I should factor it out and that ‘e’ to the “x” power is a psychoanalyst 
which must be taken into account in each factor (p. 134). 
 
These dreams occurred shortly after the episode of sudden illumination of a complex 
Riemannian geometry problem which employed the mind of the patient. For this purpose, 
he needed a mathematical book that he wasn’t able to find easily where he stayed. A 
sample copy was available in his hometown so he asked his father to send it as soon as 
possible. But when he got it he suddenly had an insight into finding a short-cut method of 
reaching the same result by an original method without even removing the wrapping 
containing the book. The patient also says that as a child he had thought that all turtles 
were snapping turtles but was fascinated by them and liked to keep one in a pail. The 
turtle also reminded him of an individual who retires into his own shell and shuts out the 
world (like his father). He had noticed that turtles blink in the sun and had associated this 
with the darkness within their shells and to his own photophobia on exposure to bright 
light. Turtles can see the outside world while they themselves remain unseen. The crack 
in the door referred to early experiences of peeping at his sisters. The room recalled his 
own bedroom at home, and his mother’s practice of watching him through a crack in the 
door when he first went to kindergarten, because of his terror at being left by her. This is 
what Rosen says about possible interpretations of these dreams. We instead would like to 
consider a possible alternative interpretative hypothesis according to which a turtle, with 
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the pulling in and out of his head, might represent a female penis disappearing within the 
mother body22 like in the Freudian cotton reel game that we will consider later. Then, 
Rosen also makes a certain interpretation of the second dream, bringing back the  to an 
X-ray examination that the patient has undergone. We would like to propose other 
possible additional variants. Rosen states that this second dream is presented to indicate 
the relationship of the illumination experience to the primal scene problem. Later, Rosen 
says that two themes are referred to which are of importance for the development of the 
theoretical formulation which will follow: the first refers to the selective use of 
perception in the service of drive and defence in scoptophilic fantasies, and the second to 
the narcissistic withdrawal from the real darkness and light surrounding the functional 
relationships of parental objects and their investment in the neutral symbols and 
relationships of mathematical invention. We add what follows. If one looks at the 
geometrical form of the graph of the real function  (which was surely known to the 
patient, given that he was a valid mathematician), it is not possible not to recognize an in-
erection phallic symbol.23 Then, the dream also compares this function with the 
psychoanalyst who, clearly by transference, corresponds to a father figure, so that this 
second dream should be more referred to the father’s phallus rather than an X-ray 
examination. Afterwards, Rosen continues to interpret these and other dreams of this 
patient substantially revolving around the Œdipus complex questions concerning the 
patient of this interesting case report, to finish with a discussion on mathematical thought 
on the basis of the previous studies made in this regard. Amongst them, we report both a 
quotation by E. Kris (an exponent of Ego psychology), namely “that hypercathexis of 
preconscious mental activity with some quantity of energy withdrawn from the object 
world to the Ego – from the perceptive system to preconscious thinking – accounts for 
some of the extraordinary achievements of mentation”, and a hypothesis, related to 
creative thought and also confirmed by clinical data, according to which there are 
suggestive borderline features as far as psychosis is concerned; a prominent sensory-
motor hypersensitivity is also a predisposing feature. Rosen also noticed the concomitant 
presence of certain disorders in writing and reading in mathematically gifted subjects, 
which have their origins during the early latency period with the still unresolved Œdipal 
conflicts. Thereafter, in discussing the role played by the primary process in creative 
thought, Rosen reviews many interesting case studies and testimonies amongst which we 
recall only those relating to N. Lobachevsky’s work on non-Euclidean geometry and A. 
Cayley’s work on algebra. Indeed, the former was built on a negation of a sensory reality 
testing, namely that parallel lines can meet, while the latter is concerned with a particular 
algebra of matrices which was seen, for many years, as a kind of bizarre algebraic oddity. 
Such an algebra starts from a postulate, in “paranoiac” fashion, which appears to be an 
absurd negation of the self-evident, namely that the products of two entities (the matrices) 
are different depending upon the order in which the multiplication is performed. In both 
cases, we have a negation of a fact considered to be evident and, notwithstanding these 
                                                22 In addition, one of the possible psychoanalytic meanings of the turtle is that of a mother with her values.  23  Following  this  interpretation  line,  maybe  it  would  be  possible  to  extend  these considerations  related  to  the  real  exponential  function    to  the  complex  case  in order  to  account  for  the  celebrated Lacan  equation  as well  as  to give  a  psychodynamic  explanation  to  the  famous  conceptual  metaphor  which is at the basis of the framework of Lakoff and Núñez (2000). Elsewhere this possibility will be taken into account. 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appeared to be a direct negation of reality, they would have notable applications in 
physics. As is well known, Freud himself gave great importance to negation for 
consciousness development in his remarkable 1925 paper Negation, and, what has been 
just said above is placeable within our framework based on disavowal because, as 
Chemama and Vandermersch (1998) claim, this paper had really to do more with 
disavowal than negation. Finally, as regards the main case study of his paper, Rosen 
stresses the occurrence of primary scene fantasies, the consequent scoptophilic and 
epistemophilic drives with related defence reactions (like pavor nocturnus, eye redness, 
etc.) and certain perplexities in gender roles, considering them to be at the root of the 
mathematical insight possessed by the patient. In addition and in relation to this, since 
Rosen also stresses the psychoanalytic meaning of the bringing of the book by his father 
in clarifying, inter alia, his doubts on gender roles, it is likely that this gender 
ambivalence worrying the patient might also be related to sex or genital differences 
which, as is well known, plays a fundamental role in the disavowal mechanism. So, we 
say, in searching a missing mother penis (the book, as surrogate of the missing primary 
object) in respect to the existent father’s one, which maybe will arrive (the sent book), the 
patient carries out a symbolic elaboration upon this lack, whose insight will resolve his 
anguish once he has found (in concomitance with the received but unwrapped book) it. 
Finally, Rosen points out a possible origin of mathematical rules by means of reaction 
formation to the primal scenes which, amongst other things, are closely related to a 
castration complex because they furnish support to the consequent castration anxiety, this 
being, in turn, strictly involved in disavowal.  
 
On mathematical symbolism - thirdly 
The history of mathematics comprises numerous examples and case studies regarding 
concepts as well as notions having anthropomorphic sources. On the other hand, as 
remembered by Piaget (1968), anthropomorphism has its roots deep in the history of 
religions and mythologies, as also briefly recalled above (see also Rosen, 1954; Canestri 
& Oliva, 1991). Many other studies on the history of mathematics, like those made in 
Ifrah (1985), confirm the primary role that the human body has played in the origins of 
the main elementary mathematical concepts, like those of number and order, up to the 
latest results and examples achieved and outlined by the cognitive science of mathematics 
as exposed by Lakoff and Núñez (2000). For instance, Georges Ifrah speaks of the 
“bodily techniques of the number” as regards the archaic origins of human awareness of 
numeric and ordinal notions, so confirming the anthropological assumptions mentioned 
above. Furthermore, following Loria (1950), in the history of mathematics, the scholar 
shouldn’t only stop at that epoch in which the human being hadn’t yet consciously 
conceived of abstract numbers. In this period, the individual indicated numbers in a 
phonetic manner, like, for example, in denoting two sheep, three goats, four oxen and so 
on, or using proper names for certain objects to denote their parts or their components, 
like, for instance, in associating the idea (or the function) of one, two, three and five 
respectively to the word “I”,24 to the wings, to the trefoil, and to the hand. Hence, 
according to Gino Loria, it would also be interesting to go further back, if one would 
really like to have some form of protohistoric knowledge on the early origins of numbers. 
According to Ifrah (1985), the numbers one and two were phylogenetically the first 
numerical intelligible notions conceived by human beings. These are also the first two 
numerical notions which are ontogenetically acquired by human beings, so that, in this 
                                                24 As a personal pronoun.  
 Language and Psychoanalysis, 2013, 2 (2), 121-160 
http://dx.doi.org/10.7565/landp.2013.009 
 
133 
case, the well-known 19th century scientists E. Haeckel and F. M. Müller’s fundamental 
biogenetic law according to which ontogenesis is, in a certain sense, a recapitulation of 
phylogenesis (at least, from a psychological viewpoint25) seems valid. The number one, 
indeed, symbolizes the active man who is associated with creative work. It also denotes 
herself or himself within the related social group, her or his own loneliness in the face of 
life and death, and it also symbolizes both human bipedalism (or else, her or his standing 
position) and the erect phallus which distinguishes man from woman. On the other hand, 
the number two refers to the fundamental duality between male and female, the 
contraposition, the complementarity and any other oppositions. Finally, since the mists of 
time, the number three has been synonymous with plurality, with multitude, with cluster, 
hence an unthinkable and unpredictable limit, so that this means that, in the human soul 
or mind, the invention of numbers has marked a first stoppage beat at number two. In 
short, the number three has a very fundamental meaning from the psychoanalytic 
viewpoint. All this is also quite coherent with what Piaget said about the development of 
number sense in children. Indeed, more or less between six and 12 months old, a child 
acquires a certain global ability to recognize the space filled by things or persons which 
are familiar to her or him, so that she or he is able to roughly conceive of a totality 
(subitization26) from some of its parts. Thereafter, approximately between 12 and 18 
months of age, she or he is capable of distinguishing between one, two and many other 
objects as well as discerning and discriminating between two distinct groups of entities of 
no more than four elements. But, at this stage, her or his numerical attitudes are still so 
primitive as to be impossible for her or him to make a clear distinction between numbers 
and clusters whose elements represent the former. Afterwards, a remarkable fact takes 
place between two years and three years old, once the child has acquired the use of 
speech and has learned to name the first numbers. To be precise, it has been noted that 
often, for a certain time, the child has great difficulty in conceiving and saying just the 
number three, starting with correctly counting from one and two but then forgetting the 
number three, hence articulating one, two, four. In the light of what has been said above, 
this might be explained by reconnecting the strong emotive-affective involvement present 
at this age with the Œdipal phase of this period and related anxieties, if one takes into 
account the genital psychoanalytical meaning of number three. In fact, according to 
Paneth (1953) and Musatti (1977), one of the main psychoanalytical meanings of number 
three is that of phallus27 (erectus) which, together with the two gonads, means capacity 
for synthesis, perfection and creativity, whence the triadicity,28 closely correlated to 
                                                25  See  previous  footnote  11.  As  is well  known,  this  law  is  ruled out  from  a  proper biological  perspective;  in  this  regard,  see  Carlson  (1981).  However,  certain  of  its forms are assumed to be more or less valid  in human sciences (see Lorenz, 1977), including psychology (see, for instance, Greenacre, 1971, p. 370).  26 See Lakoff and Núñez (2000). 27 This is the main meaning given by Freud to the number three in Chapter X of his work Symbolism in the Dream (Freud, 1915‐17). 28 This plays an  important  role not only  from  the  larger philosophical  stance  (see, for  instance,  the  theological  notions  of  trinity)  but  also  from  a  mathematical standpoint.  Indeed,  many  elementary  formal  entities  are  based  on  ternary properties,  like,  for  example,  a  function,  defined  by  a  tern  of  the  type  , where    and    are arbitrary  theoretical  sets  and    is  a  (functional)  law, or  role, which connects the former in the following manner  . See Christopherson and Johnstone Jr (1981). For triadic reality and its role in Ego’s development, see Akhtar (2009) as well as Rosen (1954). 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Œdipus triangulation which takes place in the phallic phase. Furthermore, according to 
Dehaene (1997), the number “three” seems to be the most frequent number, coherently 
with the known fact that the word “phallus” (or one of its numerous synonyms) seems to 
be the most frequently pronounced term at every age. On the other hand, according to 
Weich (1989), although fetishism most often employs concrete objects for the related 
defensive purposes involved, there are other instances in which abstract words and speech 
can be concretely used in place of, or in addition to, the more familiar material fetish, 
discussing as well certain aspects of language’s development that are pertinent just in this 
regard. Hence, the language functions are also inherent to the psychosexual phases here 
involved. Finally, following studies made by S. Dehaene and quoted in Lakoff and Núñez 
(2000), it has been ascertained that the main cerebral area involved in numerical 
questions is the lower parietal cortex (one of the most associative) where the association 
of many cerebral functions takes place, above all the sensory-motor ones (sight, hearing, 
touch, etc.), hence where the formation of corporal image will take place during own 
psychosexual development. There, the primary role that visual-spatial abilities play in 
mathematical thought is also confirmed (in this regard, see also Kreger Silverman, 2002), 
also in relation to gender differences (see Contreras et al., 2007).  
 
Two further report cases and a Freudian case study 
Herein (and in the next subsection), we report some significant clinical cases drawn from 
psychoanalytic literature, which partially bear out what is suggested in this paper. 
Following Dieckmann (1993), it is meaningful to report a clinical case treated by 
Dieckmann himself29 concerning an eternal student in mathematics who suffers from a 
form of borderline syndrome. This individual refers to having dreamed that Hitler wasn’t 
dead and that he had retaken power in Germany. He says that the SS had identified him 
as a Jew due to the fact that he had dark hair and a crooked nose. Some days later, an SS 
official pulled out a revolver to shoot him in the back of the neck. The consequent strong 
anxiety woke him. Furthermore, when he described this dream to Dieckmann, he was still 
full of anxiety, insinuating that he (that is, Dieckmann) was that SS official of the dream, 
disguised as an analyst, who would have pulled out the revolver to kill him. Clearly, the 
patient had transferred to him (i.e. Dieckmann), by projective identification, his heavy 
male aggressiveness (which is a possible symptom of his latent homosexuality which, in 
turn, is strictly related to the Œdipus complex and to the castration anxiety – see Solomon 
and Patch (1971). In doing so, the patient hoped that the analyst would free him, with his 
death, from his strong feelings of anxiety. Dieckmann was quite bewildered by that, but 
immediately had the strong sensation of being the mother of the patient. With the upper 
part of his body, Dieckmann started to do some slow movements like dandle himself, 
uttering some calming sounds without speaking. Therefore, through this projective 
counteridentification by Dieckmann, the patient became the son of the mother 
(Dieckmann), and thanks to this process the patient was reassured, and at the end he was 
able to say: it was just a dream! Now, in this regard, it is clear that the dark hair refers to 
fetish objects and the crooked nose and the revolver clearly refer to a phallic symbol. 
Moreover, it is not by chance that the patient was attracted by mathematics. Finally, to 
further validate what we have covered in this paper, we simply quote two important 
Freudian works, namely The Schreber Case of 1911, and the 1910 Leonardo da Vinci: A 
                                                29 This clinical case is mentioned in the chapter entitled “The formation of symbols in the complexual nuclei”. In interpreting this case, Dieckmann himself, at first, made use of Freudian theory, then compared it with the Jungian one. 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Memory of His Childhood. In the former, Freud tries to explain the psychosis mechanism 
through the paradigmatic instance given by the paranoia, bringing this back to projections 
of repressed strong homosexual tendencies toward his own father, which were re-enacted 
by his personal doctor. In this essay, for the first time, Freud outlined the possible 
mechanisms underlying psychoses, including disavowal. But it is, above all, the second 
Freudian study that is of fundamental importance to our purposes. Indeed, there Freud 
made a careful analysis of the following childhood memory described by Leonardo da 
Vinci. Namely, Leonardo da Vinci wrote the celebrated 1505 codex entitled Treatise on 
the Flight of Birds, and during the description of the flight of vultures, he strangely 
quoted his childhood memory (see Freud, 1989, p. 143) as follows:  
 
This detailed writing on kites seems to be my destiny, the one that is so deeply 
concerned with vultures – for I recall as one of my very earliest memories that while I 
was in my cradle, a vulture came down to me, and opened my mouth with its tail, and 
struck me many times with its tail against my lip’. 
 
After various possible (some obvious) interpretations, Freud finished by agreeing with 
the following one (see Freud, 1989, pp. 152-157, pp. 184-188). First, the curiosity for 
birds may easily be brought back to the childhood curiosity of Leonardo for childhood 
sexual explorations. Then, the vulture’s tail is, of course, a male genital organ, while the 
vulture itself is a mythological symbol of maternity. The repeated tail knockings on his 
mouth mean a strong maternal care to Leonardo, so that he was fascinated and seduced 
by his mother in childhood. According to Freud, all this firmly engraved on Leonardo 
curiosity toward genital setting differences, above all in detecting the lack of a female 
penis, which is at the basis of the strong (sublimated) observational curiosity, also 
towards nature (mother). The precocious sexual excitation, etched in Leonardo by his 
mother, has been sublimated in symbolic elaboration which, in turn, was the result of his 
great childhood curiosity arising from gender sexual differences, in primis by the lack of 
a female penis (the vulture’s tail). Thus, the early sexual researches by Leonardo had a 
decisive role in his creative attitude. Finally, the possible homosexual tendencies of 
Leonardo may be explained by the lack of an admonishing paternal figure. On the other 
hand, this absence leads to not recognizing the order of law, this being also decisive in 
creatively achieving new results beyond the preconstituted order that determines the 
borders of the knowledge field of every discipline. All this clearly confirms what is said 
in this paper, since Leonardo was one of the greatest artists and scientists of all the times.  
 
A possible reinterpretation of another Freudian case study  
As a further case, we also consider, following Vegetti Finzi (1976, pp. 29-32), Freud’s 
second chapter, entitled The Child’s Game of Fort-Da, of the well-known 1920 paper 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle. In it, observing his one and a half-year-old grandson 
Ernst, Freud tries to interpret the cotton reel game by relating this to the absence of the 
mother and to fill up the emptiness left by the lost love’s object. Whilst the child must 
undergo the turning away of the mother, with such a game he or she may retaliate against 
this, becoming an active part of such a relation. It is an essentially verbal game, the words 
fort [forth] and da [here] symbolically filling up such an object’s absence, replacing and 
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representing it in such a way as to develop the symbolic space, hence the culture. In the 
cotton reel game, it is possible to identify the three main dimensions of the own lived 
experience: the real one (the mother30), the imaginary one (the reel) and the symbolic one 
(the word), overlooking the next Lacanian theory. According to Freud, the throwing out 
of the object, in such a manner as to disappear, might to be a (symbolic) way to satisfy a 
repressed drive, consisting in avenging the mother’s abandonment, taking the meaning of 
defiance: namely, the child says, “Fine, begone as well, I do not need you, because I 
myself am to go away you!” The child himself, one year later, when he was angry with a 
toy, threw it out, roughly exclaiming: “Go to war!” At that time, indeed, it was told to 
him that his father was at war. Nevertheless, the child did not feel the father’s absence at 
all, showing that he did not want to be disturbed from his own and exclusive possession 
of the mother. This is a general way of doing of the children when they desire to express 
similar aggressive and hostile impulses, hurling out objects instead of persons. As is well 
known, d’après Melanie Klein, play is the best way to analyse a child’s unconscious, and 
Freud himself started to agree with this perspective with this 1920 work. However, given 
the age of the child herein considered, this discourse is properly inherent to the passage 
from the anal to the phallic phase until the Œdipus one, when genitality reaches its apex 
to guide the whole human personality.31 To this purpose, we would want to add that the 
above Freudian interpretation of the cotton reel game, especially that regarding the last 
part involving the father, is perhaps a little too rational (also in consideration of the 
child’s age). Instead, we would want to propose a little modification to this last 
interpretative part, in accordance with what is done in this paper. To be precise, we wish 
instead to suggest that this cotton reel game could be related to the lack of a female penis 
instead of the lack of a mother, also on the basis of what Freud says about the second 
statement, made around the age of two and a half, by his grandson as regards his own 
father (who was at war). Maybe, the child’s feeling of lack might refer just to this lack of 
a penis rather than that of a father, given also the simple fact that a reel has a phallic 
meaning: to be exact, the reel’s wire (the phallus) that appears and disappears into the 
reel (the mother) stands respectively for this penis’s presence and absence (or retirement 
into the mother’s body) which, as already said, has strong emotional charges in this 
period of life. The throwing of an object has the psychoanalytic meaning of a phallic 
erection;32 numerous phenomena of this type take place during the transition from the 
anal to the phallic phase, with an apex in the latter. Nevertheless, the psychoanalytic 
community has forever been concordant in assuming already existent precocious forms of 
castration anxiety in males and penis envy in females from two years old (see Greenacre, 
1971) which, however, will change during psychosexual development. As stated above, 
around two years old, the first steps and words begin, together the incipient formation of 
own bodily image. Moreover, as we will recall in the next subsections, the first 
communicative and linguistic functions take place as means and tools to symbolically 
explain corporal movements or to expressively imitate other external phenomena 
observed by the child. At this stage, the infant’s thought begins to form in concomitance 
with the first verbal and preverbal representations in turn based on and supported by 
corporal image formation. The child, at this age, is unable to carry out such complete 
thought, that is to say, that of the absence of the mother as a real person. Freud himself 
                                                30 Or rather, the mother’s phallus, according to our interpretation.  31  See  Vegetti  Finzi  (1976),  according  to  whom  genitality  represents  the  main 
regulative  leitmotiv  of  psychoanalysis,  due  to  its  role  in  the  formation  and structuration of human personality.  32 See Greenacre (1979, p. 253). 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dealt with this argument in discussing mourning elaboration (afterwards included into the 
1924 Kleinian depressive position) in his Mourning and Melancholia (of 1917). On the 
other hand, even if it were this, that is to say, if one took into account the above Freudian 
interpretation based on the mother absence, this mourning elaboration wouldn’t be related 
to the loss of a real person (the mother, in this case) but rather to that of an internal object 
generally cathexed by ambivalence (see Rycroft, 1968a), just like the mother phallus. 
Even in doing so, we would fall again into the realm of disavowal because this 
mechanism is just that invoked by Freud himself (for the first time) as a unique way to 
overcome this mourning and related anxiety through a psychic elaboration that 
contemplates disavowal as the first step toward this.33 According to E. Kris, then, a 
certain castration anxiety is quite intrinsic to the same bodily human structure. 
Furthermore, according to Greenacre, the (anal) castration anxiety is operative since two 
years old, and, in the anal phase, it is due to a fear of losing too the penis (in males) in 
addition to the faeces. In this period, faeces and phallus are located in the same area, and 
roughly have the same form, but in the subsequent phallic phase, the penis will assume an 
ever more predominant role, while the faeces become something to get rid of. All this 
holds as regards Freud’s grandson. Then, the fact that the child showed a certain 
intolerance towards his father has to be led back more than anything else to his entrance 
into the Œdipus phase with the end of the phallic phase. The cotton reel might then also 
have a fetishist meaning if considered as a transitional object in the Winnicott sense. 
Finally, the exclamation o-o-o (which, according to Freud, stands for “fort”) could also 
stand34 for a vocalization of wohin (or also wo), that is, “where is”, or simply “where”, 
the missing penis, whereas the other exclamation a-a-a, as above, might stand for a 
vocalization of “da”, that is, “there is” or “is here” the penis. On the other hand, 
following Bulle and Rigutini (1902, 1907), in a German dictionary drawn up in the 1890s 
by a professional German philologist Oskar Bulle (1857-1917) with the support of his 
father-in-law, the Italian philologist Giuseppe Rigutini (1829-1903), the German term 
that properly stands for “go away” is wegschicken (as first term) or fortscheiden (as 
second term), or also weggehen, which is the adverb “forth” translated into weg as first 
term and into fort as second term. Then, the expression “hunt away” is translated as 
wegjagen in the first way, and into aus dem Dienst jagen in the second way. Furthermore, 
the adverb “there” is also translated into dort, so that the exclamation o-o-o could also 
stand for the vocalization of dort, that is to say, the missing female penis “stays there”, 
where the reel has been thrown, in such a manner as to be hidden under the bed, while 
when he pulls back the reel out of the bed, he merrily says “is here” (da). In short, since 
the dictionary of Bulle and Rigutini is of the period in which Freud wrote that paper, it 
follows that the adverb fort wasn’t the first term to be frequently and commonly used to 
mean “go away” which, in German, had a more complex terminology. Hence, it is also 
likewise presumable that the exclamation o-o-o stood for fort or wo or else wohin, in 
reference to the possible localization of a missing object, the female penis in this case. 
What Freud himself says about the emotional tone with which the child expressed such 
exclamations leads us to be inclined towards this alternative interpretation of this game of 
appearing/disappearing. In fact, his grandson was much more joyful when the reel 
(female penis) reappeared rather than when it disappeared (missing penis), the former 
event being less distressing than the latter (anxiogenous). It would therefore be the 
castration anxiety at the basis of another possible interpretation of this game reported by 
Freud in his 1920 paper which, amongst others, also wanted to explain a possible origin 
                                                33 See also Galimberti (2006). 34 Which, in any case, is easier to pronounce by a child than “fort”. 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of symbolic function, hence of culture. If one instead considers  our interpretation, then 
this Freudian work would result in being another confirmation of what is herein 
suggested about the possible origins of symbolic function. All this, on the other hand, 
would turn out to be more coherent with the fact that the Lacanian theory of the 
psychoanalytic field (which, inter alia, is known to have its deep roots in the two 
cornerstones of human psychic development, namely penis envy for females and 
castration anxiety for males (see Dell’Io, 1994) – starts from the Ego’s splitting based on 
disavowal, as briefly recalled above. On the other hand, Lacan stressed the symbolic 
meaning and its possible relationships with language, the absence and presence 
phenomena described in this Freudian paper; the absence-presence pair provides the first 
opposition to introduce the symbolic order. Lacan himself, in one of his celebrated 
seminaries, alludes to the possible relations between Winnicott’s transitional object and 
this reel.  
 
From fetishism to mathematics and physics  
Now, according to what has been said in a previous section, between two and three years 
old the phallic phase takes place, in which, as we have seen, the castration complex 
prevails with related phenomena, in concomitance with the Œdipus complex. As we have 
seen, in this phase the disavowal mechanism (which starts, in its incipient form, in the 
preceding anal phase) acts with its consequences, so that the above-mentioned psychic 
phenomena related to counting and to the evanescence of number three might be 
correlated with it, or brought back to it, given the Freudian (phallic) psychoanalytic 
meaning of number three. So, we would want to focus attention just on these last 
remarks: that is to say, we wish to identify the formation of human symbolic function in 
concomitance with this Freudian psychosexual evolution phase (namely, the phallic one, 
but with a view too to the previous anal phase) by means of the disavowal mechanism 
intended as a fundamental psychic formation mechanism which acts in every human 
being, but which might have degenerative variants (for instance, toward psychotic 
disorders or paraphilias). In our view, this basic Freudian mechanism (initially considered 
as a simple Ego defence mechanism but later hypothesized to be also a normal psychic 
formation mechanism35 by Freud himself in his last 1938 work) has been quite neglected 
after Freud, except for some notable exceptions. Furthermore, from what has been said so 
far, it will be possible to put forward the hypothesis that symbolic thought (including the 
abstract one) is formed according to this mechanism during this psychic phase (the 
phallic one). In such a manner, it would also be possible to give some explanation as to 
what the famous physicist and mathematician Eugene Paul Wigner affirmed (Wigner, 
1960) upon the close relationships between mathematics and physics, speaking of an 
“unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences” about the efficacy of 
mathematics to symbolically explain the external phenomenic reality; indeed, according 
to what has been said in this paper, this could be explained simply by the fact that the 
                                                35  It  will  play,  amongst  others,  a  very  basic  role  in  the  later  pioneering works  of Melanie Klein and Jacques Lacan. It will be necessary therefore to go on beyond this paper  with  another  one  which  should  take  into  account  the  Lacan  perspective according to which, to access to symbolic order (hence, the linguistic one), a primary role is just played by disavowal, as already envisaged by Freud himself in his 1925 seminal paper The Negation, a work which nowadays  is known to have to do with the  disavowal  mechanism  rather  than  the  negation  one  (see  Chemama  & Vandermersch, 1998). 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human being starts to symbolically represent a really perceived object (the phallus, which 
is missing in the female) in a fetishistic manner, by means of a precise psychic 
mechanism (the Freudian disavowal) that takes place, as already stated, during a well-
defined phase (the phallic one) of her or his psychic evolution. Indeed, as stated above, 
this fetish formation has a strict correlation with symbolic function, putting the human 
being into a close (symbolic) relationship with the external reality, at least in those cases 
in which it does not degenerate. On the other hand, following Carnap (1966), the very 
basic principle which lies at the foundation of every measurement process – hence, of the 
experimental scientific method (which, roughly speaking, combines mathematical 
analysis and experimentation36) – is the comparison one: if there exists an arbitrary 
comparison method, then a (related) measurement principle is always possible through 
the subsequent assignment of quantitative rules whose results are numbers (measures). 
And, what deeper psychodynamic mechanism of comparison can there be if not the 
identification of gender sexual differences by the child, hence of the lack of a female 
penis? Furthermore, as we have seen above, there is a close connection between numbers 
and their Freudian psychoanalytic meaning contextualized within the psychosexual 
stadial development of the human being which should also explain the natural human 
tendency to assign numbers to natural phenomena. On the other hand, following 
D’Amore (2009), whenever we try to evoke a mathematical object, like a line, we must 
necessarily represent it through a semiotic register, that is to say, geometrically with a 
sketch, or algebraically with an equation ( ), or denoting it with the index 
finger (clearly, a phallic symbol), or evoking it with written or spoken words. All these 
representations are not the line (as a mathematical object) but its evocations, its semiotic 
pictures, its images. The mathematical line, in its own simplest realistic meaning, does 
not exist. Algebra is the highest expression of a decathected process while geometry deals 
with spatial relationships in their most attenuated form but still in a guise which is 
capable of visual representation (see Rosen, 1954). 
 
On conceptual metaphors 
What has been said in this paper about the primary role played by bodily image formation 
may be also laid out into the general cognitive context of embodied knowledge which, as 
said above, seems to find experimental confirmation by neuroscience studies on mirror 
neurons. Within this context the important work of George Lakoff and Rafael E. Núñez 
on embodied mathematics is therefore laid out. Their celebrated work (Lakoff & Núñez, 
2000) is based above all on the general linguistic notion of conceptual metaphor 
according to which, roughly speaking, abstract human ideas make use of cognitive 
mechanisms to bring back to sensory-motor experiences; that is to say, the abstract is 
understood through the concrete. This viewpoint has already been philosophically 
proposed (see Cuccio, 2012), while a more scientific perspective to this idea will be given 
by the Greenacre researches. As the authors themselves recall, most of our thoughts and 
conceptual systems are sources from the cognitive unconscious, which is a construct 
wider than the psychoanalytic one; indeed, it comprises not only the repressed content 
but, in general, every sort of non-conscious thought, just to use a simple negation. 
According to Lakoff and Núñez, perhaps the main and most surprising result achieved by 
cognitive science is that most of our thoughts are unconscious. And mathematics does not 
make an exception. All our own ideas start from our corporal experiences, including the 
mathematical ones. Nevertheless, these authors point out that a deep explanation of the 
                                                36 See Segrè (1964, p. 1). 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implicit origins of these ideas is missing. For them, conceptual metaphors are mostly part 
of the cognitive unconscious. They say that these mainly originate from our childhood 
experience, invoking a sort of fusion of embodied experiences as sources of them. Such a 
process is analogous with the formation of corporal image during childhood as we will 
see later, above all with the notable work of Phyllis Greenacre who conducted 
fundamental studies on the possible relationships between creativity and perversions. In 
such a fusion, contemporaneous (or synchronic) active involvement takes place, with 
emotive attendance, of different parts of the body. But mathematical creativity has 
nothing to do with elementary arithmetic, but rather with abstraction, which is mainly 
symbolic in its deep nature. In this regard, the psychoanalytic perspective might 
accomplish this, as we have tried to do with this paper. Indeed, the disavowal mechanism 
is basically centred on a corporal insight whose outcomes will then be unconsciously 
elaborated with repercussions on the Ego structure, hence on cognitive tasks. Therefore, 
what is here proposed might answer this demand for clarification of these implicit 
questions that Lakoff and Núñez (whose viewpoint is that of the cognitive science of 
mathematics) claim. They state that there is an unavoidable unconscious conceptual 
system underlying the whole mathematical framework. In this regard, the psychoanalytic 
paradigm may lend a valid model to explain the primary sources of conceptual 
metaphors. Lakoff and Núñez again make proposal about why mathematical knowledge 
has not been extended to the unconscious realm.37 This is not completely true: indeed, the 
important work of Ignacio Matte Blanco tried to successfully move in this direction, as 
we have briefly outlined in Iurato (2013). It seems that there is a certain reluctance to use 
the psychoanalytic pattern where it is needed. We instead assume a certain democratic 
epistemological viewpoint in the general context of psychological sciences. Indeed, 
extending an epistemological principle due to the physicist Richard P. Feynman,38 it is 
possible to consider each of the various psychological trends as a model describing a part 
or aspect of the complex psychic reality. Only all together will they give a more unitary 
and complete view of this entity which is shown to have a multiple and varied nature.39 
So, the psychoanalytic paradigm might shed light upon those unconscious aspects that are 
not very clear to the cognitive sciences, without demanding full authority. From the point 
of view outlined in this paper, we have tried to descry a possible origin of symbolic 
function by action of the disavowal mechanism. This might turn out to be useful to 
explain many not properly cognitive aspects of mathematical thought, for instance, to 
(epistemological) integrate the Lakoff and Núñez perspective on the cognitive science of 
                                                37 Even if they do not quote Freud at all or, in general, psychoanalysis, in their work.  38  According  to  Feynman  (1965)  (see  also  Baženov,  1977),  in  physics  there  exist many models  which  can  equivalently  describe  the  same  physical  entity  but  from different  viewpoints.  He  takes  into  consideration  the  Babylonian  perspective  on physics according to which there exist various different theories, including many to reciprocal  relationship, but  there does not exist  a unique axiomatic  system within which they are laid out. So, Feynman speaks of a principle of multiplicity and variety 
of  equivalent  descriptions,  briefly  known  as  Feynman’s  epistemological  principle, which  might  be  extended,  in  some  respects,  to  the  case  of  the  variety  of psychological theories.  39 A  similar perspective  is provided by Carotenuto  (1982)  in  the  case of  the many psychoanalytic paradigms, but that may be easily extended to the general setting of the  various  psychological  trends  as  confirmed  by  Caramelli  (1984,  1985). Nevertheless, K. Bühler had already hoped for a unitary view of psychic processes that overcame the divergences of the various psychological schools. 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mathematics. On the other hand, following Hopkins (2000), there are close relationships 
between psychoanalysis and the source-target domain structure of a conceptual metaphor 
as understood by Lakoff and co-workers, again underlying the central role played by 
corporal image. Following Hopkins (2000, p. 4): 
 
 
Where the source domain is A and the target B, so that in mapping the domains we 
think of B in terms of A, we can speak of B as metaphor of A. Thus we seem to make 
use of a metaphor of a relationship as a journey. In this we use concepts of objects, 
properties, and relations from the domain of travel or journeys in order to 
conceptualize objects, properties, and relations in the domain of co-operative personal 
relationships, such as love. In doing this we systematically take persons in such 
relations to correspond to travellers, their particular relationship to the vehicle in 
which they are travelling, and their goals in the relationship to their destinations in 
travelling. Thus we may speak of such a relationship as going along well, slowing 
down, going nowhere, getting stuck, at a crossroads, at a dead end, and so on.  
 
The reference to the triadic structure40 by such a metaphor notion as well as to its 
essential meaning to replace or represent an absent object (the female penis in the source 
domain) with another symbol (in the target domain) is clear. Nevertheless, Hopkins does 
not make the allusion to the disavowal mechanism and related phenomena either explicit 
or implicit, even if many interesting points discussed by him might be laid out in this 
explanatory framework considered in this paper.  
 
On transitional objects and fetishism: I  
In Greenacre (1971), the author argues about an important study conducted by her on the 
nature of inspiration in relation to the phallic phase. At the end of this phase, the child 
should be able to distinguish herself or himself from the external world. The faeces 
assume the role of objects which are no longer so strictly correlated to own body but 
belong to the external world and have the double quality of being good or nasty. In this 
sense, we are much nearer to the Winnicott notion of transitional object as well as to the 
notions of good and bad object of Melanie Klein. Thanks to her or his conquered 
standing position as well as to the sensory-motor refinement, the child is able to 
distinguish between substance and appearance (or form). The obscurity arouses 
contrasting sentiments, fascinating or scaring. The faeces have the meaning both of birth 
                                                40 Which also  seems  to  recall  the  triadic structural model  (with  its  communication functions) provided by K. Bühler which will exert a great influence on the final work of R. Jakobson that in turn will play a basic role in Lacan’s work. 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(from the anus) and death. According to Greenacre, in this period, that is around four 
years old, it seems that there is a correspondence between the first forms of 
consciousness, good or bad hygienic behaviour and the awareness that dreams are just 
that and not real events that occurred during the night. The control and usage of 
physiological needs in this period are closely connected with the internalization and 
comparison of external inputs with imagination and conscious thought. These control 
functions are mainly located in the genital area which is highly sensitive to external 
stimuli. Thereafter, castration anxiety (anal castration) starts to appear, even if it is 
qualitatively different from the one present in the Œdipal phase (phallic castration). The 
related modalities of explication are different for males and females. In Greenacre (1971), 
the author discusses fetish and transitional object from a comparative stance. There exist 
many common points between fetish and transitional object, the latter practically 
ubiquitous and not necessarily entailing a degeneration. The latter is usually abandoned 
after infancy but may be extended to accomplish fetishist functions. The transitional 
object, as meant by Winnicott, is usually the first object recognized as belonging to the 
not-Me (or not-I; see above point a) of previous section) but not in a full manner. It is 
created around one year old from the symbiotic mother-child pair, when verbal capacities 
are uncertain. Greenacre alludes to a basic role played by the choice and formation of this 
transitional object in creativity. The fetish is above all a bisexual symbol that allows 
sexual differences to be refused and affirmed. The fetish is almost never spontaneously 
abandoned because it is the only one thanks to which a sexual satisfaction is possible. 
Following Greenacre (1971), by comparing the Winnicott notion of transitional object 
with that of fetish, it is possible to identify some main common aspects. First, there is a 
kind of symbolic magic in both. In particular, the symbolic nature of a transitional object 
is quite primitive, through which the infant starts to cast bridges with the external world 
even if it initially has a multiform, nebulous, evanescent and changeable nature (like the 
symbol, as recalled in Part 1) but inspires a sense of confidence and assurance to the 
possible frustrations and anxieties due to a still weak sense of reality. It is the first object 
created by the child with the help of the mother, which will assume a meaning assigned to 
it by the child herself or himself. Through its institution, he or she will be able to 
establish further object relations. It is ubiquitous, although the period of its usage is 
variable. Nevertheless, the initial emotional charge cathexed into the transitional object 
gradually vanishes (often towards games), whereas that of fetish is persistent and 
continuous also in adult age, without doubts about its nature and existence. In the latter, 
which should represent the mother phallus, material elements and magic essences (mainly 
due to enchantments and self-hypnotic procedures) are intimately mixed, in a persistent 
manner. Second, the relationships with aggressiveness are quite different in both cases. 
The transitional object rather has supportive, intimate and fond relationships with the 
mother (from which it arises, as the fetish), not marked by an aggressiveness so intense as 
to become hostile as in fetishism, which has a coagulated anger sprung out of the fear of 
castration, mainly due to primal scene traumas. The transitional object undergoes a 
gradual separation from the mother with a certain amount of aggressiveness, but 
incomparable with the one that fetish has. It is the cross point between the non-hostile 
aggressiveness of growth and the object of love. The transitional object usually arises 
when a good enough mother is present, otherwise hostile aggressiveness or frustrations 
will be the predominant features. The fetish has its source from the mother’s body, from 
her genital zone to be precise, hence is characterized by an aggressiveness turned toward 
an own narcissistic satisfaction and not as a means of love like the transitional object. It 
takes place in its material and noticeable form through a latency phase to adolescence. 
Sadomasochistic fantasies and practices are common features of fetishists. The 
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transitional object has a fundamental role in building up the own individuality and sense 
of reality, and may diversify if necessary to the various next purposes. Instead, the fetish 
is a surrogate of the genital zone of the corporal image. It has a narrow action area and is 
never used for other purposes if not for a sexual one.  
 
On transitional objects and fetishism: II  
We now discuss the role played by fetish and transitional object in imaginative function, 
following the careful analysis made by Greenacre (1971). Taking into account what was 
said in the previous section, the overlapping between transitional object and fetish 
phenomenologies are non-void, in which their common aspects fall. From this, just when 
the transitional object gradually starts to vanish, the fetish formation begins almost like a 
continuation of the former, at least in degeneration cases. According to M. Sperling, 
Winnicott’s transitional object is considered as a kind of infantile fetish, further pointing 
out the comparison between these entities. At this point, in relation to the non-empty area 
given by common aspects between fetish (infantile fetish) and transitional object, we 
might rightly call transitional-fetishist objects the entities falling in this area. Now, we 
debate on the close relationships existing between transitional-fetishist objects and 
symbolism, imagination and creativity, also taking into account the fact that during the 
period of formation of these objects, that is to say from two to four years old, the first 
language properties start to form. According to Greenacre, the capacity to develop 
illusion and imagination is the main useful (but also potentially dangerous) feature of a 
transitional object. In general, the formation of illusion is a general and natural 
phenomenon that exists throughout life, which may be defined as the consequences of a 
wrong interpretation of one or more stimuli. When we have a sensorial stimulation, the 
consequent perception of related data is normally performed. Nevertheless, this sensorial 
experience is apperceived by the observer according to the emotional state of that 
moment. The various changes that take place are possible only thanks to rapidity of free 
associations. In adult age, the illusions are often created in those situations in which there 
is some obstacle to the usual and normal clearness of sensorial consciousness or 
apperception, also due to inhibiting or hindering external conditions. Then, the collective 
situations increase such perturbations and deviations which favour the illusion, above all 
when a common ideology exists that makes the possible choices biased. In this case, the 
doubtful or dissenting individual may have a general Weltanschauung that is much more 
exact or valid than the collective one. In these general terms, it is clear that the child is 
more inclined to create illusions. The only available means of acquisition for children are 
those provided by sensorial experiences which are mainly promoted, developed and 
managed by the mother from pregnancy, where a considerable role is played by the 
introjection-projection mechanisms of primary identification which are already very 
active during the prenatal phase (see Sasso, 2007). The ability to distinguish between Me 
and not-Me, the animate and the inanimate, the mobile and the immobile, and so on, is 
quite uncertain in the child. The ability to determine and to distinguish between the form 
and contour of external objects develops with the increasing awareness of the own body 
acquired thanks to sensations due to endogenous experiences as well as to explorations of 
the own body. In this precocious period the transitional object appears as a means of 
comparison between already acquired knowledge and further experimentations, hence as 
a first object for establishing subsequent non-aggressive and sympathetic object relations 
in the wake of the previous relationships with the mother and her body of which the 
transitional object will be the natural continuation beyond the restricted bodily confines 
towards the wider external world. Gradually, the transitional object will be replaced by a 
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toy or various other objects, parallel to the development of imaginative skills, in non-
degenerative cases, while in cases in which aggressiveness tendencies prevail it gradually 
becomes an infantile fetish which will further evolve towards an adult fetish in 
degenerative cases. Therefore, the emotional components of aggressiveness involved in 
this period will play a crucial role in choosing one way or the other. The possible shift 
from a transitional object to an infantile fetish is shown by a clinical case reported in 
Roiphe and Galenson (1975) where a separation experience was able to lead to a serious 
pre-Œdipal castration reaction, by which the transitional object was no longer capable of 
serving its ordinary function and was replaced by a fetishistic object (infantile fetish). 
 
Fetishism and bodily image: I 
Thanks to its great plasticity,41 the transitional object will allow further multidimensional 
connections to be instituted through associations with many other external objects which 
may be represented by means of a spontaneous playful activity. This activity, which was 
initially free, spontaneous and casual, gradually becomes constrictive and more organized 
under the internal pressure of maturational tendencies to give a sense of reality and 
security in the wake of the good mother aspects, if there are any. The transitional object is 
the first creative object made by the child, an indispensable help for her or his psychic 
growth. With her or his own imagination and creativity, the child gives a form to this 
object, instituting with it various possible relations with other objects of her or his 
imagination or of the external world. The transitional object is moulded on her or his 
previous (if any) relationships with the good mother of whom it will constitute her 
symbolic representative. Instead, it will degenerate into an infantile fetish when the bad 
mother has instituted a perturbative relation with her child, giving rise to a damaged 
corporal image which he or she tries to remediate by means of narcissistic satisfactions in 
the latency phase or puberty, during which the adult fetish starts to form in concomitance 
with strong castration fears. Starting from these notable Winnicott ideas, in particular 
considering the transitional object as the first object created by the child, Greenacre was 
naturally led to consider the obvious links existing between the transitional object 
formation and creative as well as imaginative abilities. According to the official 
biographies of the most important scientists in history, there are numerous cases (see, for 
example, Isaac Newton) in which childish play has played an important role in 
developing their creative and imaginative abilities. According to Greenacre, illusion is a 
fundamental human capacity which can be improved by means of the correction of wrong 
perceptions with the own lived experience that gradually every human being acquires 
through her or his comparison with the external world. To this end, the transitional object 
plays a fundamental role in the conformation of the perception with reality, trying to 
avoid the delirium (or hallucinations) which may arise in the case of inadequacy of the 
related involved emotional control. In some respects, the relationship between (correct or 
real) illusion and delirium might be roughly compared to the relationship between 
transitional object and fetish. However, this situation is rather more complex in early 
infancy in which a primary role is played by the set of perceptive experiences undergone 
by the child during her or his development, which take place from the first one-year-old 
abilities to distinguish the Self from the Other. Nevertheless, in childhood, the child has a 
sensitivity that is so high that he may perform discriminations between objects that the 
adult may consider to be equal, this being due to a different higher perception of Gestalt 
                                                41 In what follows, we refer to Greenacre (1971), which includes the contents of the basic Greenacre papers (1953, 1955, 1957). 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by a child than by an adult. In childhood, the perception field of a child is so susceptible 
and highly reactive thanks to the concomitant development of her or his bodily 
kinaesthetic formation and sensorial-somatic experience enrichment,42 whose outcomes 
will contribute to the parallel carrying out of the phenomenology of introjective-
projective relationships with the external world. The repetitive comparison between the 
outcomes of the former processes with the external objects will form the central core of 
the own stabilized knowledge through which it will be possible to recognize the various 
objects already examined. All that will only be possible for the child if the mother is 
present as support to this protective activity and explorative knowledge. A prominent role 
will also be played by all the various emotive reactions with which she will assist such a 
primary child development. Although the maternal figure might be replaced by other so-
called carers (even if not in a perfectly equivalent manner), the basic introjective-
projective mechanism system between the Self and the Other will never be abandoned 
throughout life.43 It will play a basic role in emphatic and emotional growth. Thereafter, 
the various sensory-motor outputs coming from all the sensitive organs will be 
organized44 to give rise to symbolic vocal forms of language, which are one of the main 
creative features of human beings. Greenacre then supposes that the extreme complexity 
of perceptivity due to the multiple combinatorial characteristics of the set of the first two-
year-old elementary sensory-motor stimuli lie at the source of as many multiple illusions 
which have the main function to stabilize the evaluation of the object of the various 
object relationships. At the same time, this infinite possibility of different combinations 
of the perceptive elements, in turn, allows shades, shadows and ambiguities which are the 
source of symbolic function, which is a considerable component of originality. The 
creative person is able to play with analogies and resemblances which, suitably 
(unconsciously) managed, may lead to a new, useful and harmonious combination which 
might give rise to her or his original contribution. According to Greenacre, illusion plays 
a very fundamental role in creativity because it may furnish the stimulus for a further 
primitive invention. Creativity is a prominent ability in those individuals who show they 
have a very great and unusual sensitivity for every sensorial-kinaesthetic stimulation that, 
                                                42 The gastrointestinal system and the genital zones are the main (but not unique) bodily areas involved in such a childish sensorial consciousness of the first two years of life.  43  The maternal  cares  (only  of  a  good mother)  are  of  fundamental  importance  in developing and  in bringing about  the  somatic experience  field.  In  this  regard,  it  is enough  to  recall  that  Freud,  in  the  1910  Leonardo  da  Vinci:  A  Memory  of  His 
Childhood, was able to recognize a great somatic relation between Leonardo da Vinci and  his  mother:  indeed,  Freud  told  of  many  childish  experiences  of  Leonardo  in which his mother numerous times covered him with many kisses, so increasing and enriching his somatic perception with these very close maternal touches (see Freud, 1989). As we know, then, the deep somatic and sensitive exchanges are of primary importance  for  the  child  (see  Greenacre,  1971).  They  originate  from  the  initial mother‐child  symbiotic  relation,  to  which  the  child  will  respond  with  a  suitable 
reflecting  reaction  (see Greenacre,  1971)  after  having  almost  subliminally  (Stern’s transubstantiation)  absorbed  the  mother  stimuli.  In  this  regard,  see  the  basic studies of Daniel N. Stern (1985), in which the primary role played by the mother in the  first  two  years  of  the  child’s  life  is  further  highlighted.  Stern  speaks  of  a 
transubstantiation which  takes  place  between  child  and mother during  this  initial symbiotic phase (see also Piscicelli, 1994). 44 According to almost universal structures and roles. 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together with the correspondent introjective-projective reactivity, leads to a clearer 
consciousness of Gestalt. Just these last introjective-projective reactions, above all in the 
periods in which the capacity of autonomous movements increases, may contribute to the 
illusory animation of inanimate objects as well as to the deanimation of parts of the own 
corporal image. According to Greenacre, this stage of perception of the external world in 
terms of the own body may be considered as a precursor of the next ability to transform 
games and other objects in a projective extension of parts of the own body. In this, the 
author invokes the analogy with the prolonged use of the transitional object by the child 
which nevertheless may degenerate into infantile fetish in cases of insufficient good 
mother behaviours, thereby transforming the potentially creative illusions into possible 
deliria. In any case, the transitional object, whatever function it has, is a tangible symbol 
of a relation which is undergoing a change (whence its name) toward different possible 
alternatives. Amongst the normal ones (and not degenerating into fetishism), there is the 
one in which this object will be abandoned as an obsolescent and without any more sense 
thing; or the one in which it will be creatively converted into a material toy or into a 
coherent and realizable fantasy, thus developing the higher forms of creative imagination. 
These last changes may take place only when the own Ego’s development has reached a 
point of self-awareness, that is to say, the child is conscious about having and controlling 
a form of thought which belongs to her or him. This favourable change is allowed only 
when the aggressive drives are managed by herself or himself on the basis of what is 
made by her or his good or bad mother in developing the proper corporal image; 
otherwise, the fetishistic drifts are unavoidable, as surrogates to these latter deficiencies. 
As stated above on perversions, Khan Masud agrees with what is said in this subsection 
and the next. 
 
Fetishism and bodily image: II  
In Greenacre (1971), an interesting discussion on a 1969 work by E. Galenson about 
possible sources of symbolic thought and its influences on sublimation processes is 
conducted (see also Gay, 1992). Galenson discusses on the verbal, non-verbal processes 
and their relationships as well as their possible role in creative thought. She stresses 
verbalized and non-verbalized games and their role in creativity. In this regard, a careful 
analysis of language function was needed. Play comprises movement, imitation and 
action and generally it is a spontaneous expression of pleasure and spontaneity. 
According to K. Groos, play will anticipate the subsequent kinds of adult activity. Play 
has been a fundamental analysis and research tool upon which the work of Melanie Klein, 
in psychoanalysis, and of Maria Montessori,45 in pedagogy, has been successfully built 
up. The various toys and objects involved in play basically have the meaning and the 
function of prolongation of body parts. They are the result of a kind of cathexis of a 
surplus of bodily energy whose excess needs to be released during bodily growth, while 
also taking into account environmental opportunities. The modalities of these energetic 
investments are multiples, and the plasticity with which they will be satisfied are at the 
sources of secondary thought processes. It seems that thought is the ability to retain and 
                                                45 This is well known as the appreciated Montessori method is, amongst other things, based on a full development of all the sensor‐perceptive abilities of a child as well as on the coherent and harmonic  integration of  their outcomes. On the other hand,  a further confirmation of the primary importance of play in the symbolic formation in concomitance with the primary and fundamental relation mother‐child is due to M. Milner (1955). 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to use interior images sprung out from sensory-motor and somatic experiences which are 
acquired with modalities very similar to those of play, although experimented in different 
conditions and opportunities. This retention, then, is closely related to the sense of time, 
which is a valuable support to the forms of representation given to these images. During 
this period, between the end of the first year and the beginning of the second, 
communication abilities and language functions begin to develop coherently and parallel 
to the main formation processes of corporal image, as stated above. The first linguistic 
phenomena are mainly imitative, like exclamations and preverbal vocalizations to 
symbolically denote corporal movements. The fact is that language also starts during the 
period of sphincter development and it is clinically known as well that child language 
may be greatly influenced by the control of sphincters. Therefore, according to 
Greenacre, there is a great plasticity in the bodily organization which is the basis for the 
image of Self, characterized by synchronic or parallel developments of various and 
different parts of the body which therefore will turn out to influence each other by means 
of simple energetic displacements. In short, Greenacre thinks that there exists a sort of 
somatic background for symbolism. Furthermore, starting from the above-mentioned 
discussion on sphincter development, Greenacre points out that the phallic phase plays a 
fundamental role in the further establishment of object relationships. Finally, Greenacre 
comes back again to creativity compared with secondary process thought and play. 
Greenacre points out that certain creative predispositions are innate.46 Out of these, there 
is a great running of sensory-motor apparatus which will contribute to a better formation 
both of the perception field and of the set of possible responses to external stimuli. All 
this will then be developed and assisted by the symbiotic child-mother relation. The 
mother at first will constitute the primary object of the child’s interests, around whom 
subsequently other peripheral objects might represent or summarize her body or parts of 
it, which she will promote in dependence on the degree to which she is a good mother. 
Greenacre calls these collective alternatives or substitutes, and these are variously 
invested by libidinal energy as well as non-hostile aggressive manifestations. Besides 
being crucial points in the perceptive consciousness field, these substitutes will form the 
seeds of the subsequent affective relations with the external world of which the mother 
body is an unavoidable intermediary. These objects will be the first steps through which 
relationships are interwoven with the external world, toward an increasing own autonomy 
and independence from the mother. They are also the necessary precursors of play as well 
as of other creative interests. In conclusion, in the predisposed child, the appearance of 
multiple symbolic functions is based on the institution of these collective alternatives 
which are mainly the result of external preverbal or partially verbal impressions entrusted 
to replace the primary intimate contacts with the mother.  
  
On algebraic symbolism and other  
This paper has sprung out of a discussion, exclusively performed within the cognitive 
psychology context, enjoined with Professor Antonella D’Amico, a valid cognitive 
psychologist from the Department of Psychology of the University of Palermo, about 
some gender differences in certain mathematical attitudes observed in children and 
adolescents.47 To be precise, Lipari and D’Amico (2009) observed major abstraction 
                                                46  And,  following  Sasso  (2007),  we  would  want  to  bring  them  back  to  the introjective‐projective process system formation of the prenatal phase. 47  For  a  general  review  on  gender  differences  in  creativity,  see  the  recent  essay article by Hill and Rogers (2012). 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ability in boys compared to girls, above all as regards algebraic attitudes in which, as is 
well known, the symbolic function plays a very crucial role.48 Clearly, from their point of 
view (that is to say, the cognitive science one), these authors have not given any possible 
psychoanalytic motivation to this detected fact. The outcomes of Lipari and D’Amico 
(2009) are also confirmed, again within the cognitive viewpoint, by Real Ortega and 
Ursini (2010), who detected, however, a certain general difficulty in symbolizing and 
interpreting algebraic variables, even if males are favoured compared to females. Their 
following conclusions will be easily laid out into a framework based on the disavowal 
mechanism. To be precise, their conclusions reported the following: 
 
 
All the students had more difficulties with the variable as a general number and with 
related variables than with the variable as a specific unknown. In particular, they had 
difficulties with the symbolization and interpretation of these two uses of variable. We 
found gender differences between male and female students in 31 of 33 questions. 
Males obtained higher scores than females, but these differences were significant only 
for 12 items. The percentage of unanswered problems was higher for females than 
males. Significant differences favouring boys were found in the interpretation of a 
variable as a general number and as a specific unknown, when interpretation, 
manipulation and symbolization of a variable as a general number were required. 
Considering the interpretation of a variable in a functional relationship, focusing on 
the variation of variables and on the range of variation, girls had more difficulties than 
boys in flexibly moving between different uses of variables. This finding allows us to 
establish that gender differences exist when students work with two or three uses of 
variables in the solution procedure. The differences were related to the interpretation 
of a variable in these three different uses and aspects. Clearly, the gender differences 
were more significant in those exercises in which students need to shift between 
different uses of variables as facets of the same mathematical object and when they are 
required to integrate these different uses. Male and female students tended to interpret 
                                                48  This,  however,  does  not  imply  any  notable  difference  in  logical  reasoning, which seems to be equal in both sexes. 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the variable incorrectly. Frequently, they interpreted the variable as an unknown when 
the interpretation of the variable as a general number was required. For tautological 
expressions, female students interpreted the variable as unknown. The incorrect 
interpretation of the variable in a specific mathematical context may lead to errors 
such as the concatenation of algebraic terms. Students, in general, had difficulties in 
accepting a negative number or fraction as a valid solution to an algebraic equation. 
[…] Our findings have shown that these are gender differences when working with 
variables. More research is needed in this direction, nationally and internationally (pp. 
196-197). 
 
All the above-mentioned authors, then, adduce mainly some social-cultural motivations 
for trying to explain these differences. In contrast, with this paper, we would like to 
suggest a first possible psychodynamic explanation for this fact. Indeed, it is clear that the 
disavowal mechanism has certain substantial different implications in respect of gender 
differences, due to their intrinsic nature as has been defined and considered above all by 
Freud but also by post-Freudian authors. Boys have a greater propensity to a symbolic 
and abstract function than girls because of the different approach with which they 
emotively experience this female lack of a penis. Hereupon, the action of this general 
psychic mechanism as well as its outcomes will take place with different modalities. On 
the other hand, it is now known that many mathematical attitudes get their primary 
sources mainly from visual-spatial abilities49 as well as from bodily sensations 
                                                49 Which phylogenetically may be explained by the major male curiosity in looking at  and  finding  the  female  genital  organs which were  occulted  to  his vision  by  the conquered  standing  position  of  the  genus  Homo  (see  Piscicelli,  1994).  Then,  as further confirmation of what is said in this paper, according to Hadamard (1996), it seems  that  mathematical  thought  has  its  deep  roots  mainly  in  visual‐spatial properties  and  abilities,  while  its  creativity  force  substantially  comes  from  the unconscious. According to this eminent author, then, linguistic and verbal properties play  a  minor  role  in  the  mathematical  creativity  field,  while  he  assigns  a predominant role to visual and imaginative abilities. On the other hand, the history of mathematics  comprises  celebrated cases of  important mathematical discoveries or  inventions  coming  from  insights  in  turn  stimulated  or  motivated  by  real situations or images: for instance, H. Lebesgue, in working out his famous theory on integration, had an important insight during the building of a brick wall (see Hoare &  Lord,  2002).  Likewise,  J.  Leray,  in  brooding  upon  a  mathematical  question  on turbulence,  had  a  sudden  insight  by observing  the  eddies  of  the  Seine  (see Ruelle (1991).  Therefore,  an  imaginative  or  visual  or  geometrical  mind  is  a  basic requirement  also  in  mathematical  intuition.  Following  Rosen  (1954),  Hadamard himself  refers  to  his  own  subjective  observations.  In  repeating  the  proof  of  the classic  proposition  that  the  sequel  of  prime numbers  is  unlimited,  he  says  that  “a 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(embodiment50). However, the primary aim of this paper has been above all to try to 
explain a possible origin of human symbolic function from a psychodynamic stance, by 
means of the last Freudian thought of Freud (1938), starting from a case study drawn 
from mathematics. Nevertheless, this simple line of research deserves further attention, 
for instance by orienting the attention towards a general study of symbolic function, 
which has started with this paper to move toward other knowledge fields, including the 
linguistic one, where such a function also plays a fundamental role besides the 
mathematical one, as briefly recalled in Part 1. Furthermore, it would be of a certain 
interest to deeply study the metonymic and metaphoric properties of the fetish which 
were briefly recalled in Part 1, as well as to compare what is proposed here with the 
emergence of human linguistic functions which take place during the passage from the 
anal to the phallic phase. Indeed, on the basis also of the many sources consulted, we are 
strongly inclined to think that the characteristic relationships between the semantic and 
syntactic features of the fetish are, in a certain sense, homologous to those related to 
physics and its formal language, that is to say, between its semantic and syntactic aspects. 
In other words, the formation of bodily image, as described above, is of fundamental 
importance in establishing the possible and right relationships (syntax) between its 
                                                                                                                                       group  of  vague  unstructured  spots  of  different  cluster  qualities  stand  out  at  each decisive  stage  of  the  proof  before  the  stage  (itself)  comes  clearly  to  mind”.  Also, concerning the problem of considering a sum of infinite numbers of terms intending to evaluate its order of magnitude, he states that “when I think of that question, I see not the formula itself, but the space it would take if written; a kind of ribbon which is thicker or darker at the place corresponding to the possible important terms … or as  I  should  see  it,  being  strongly  far‐sighted,  if  I  had  no  glasses  on”.  Could  it  be perhaps  that  this  ribbon  stands  for,  or  is  in  place  of,  the  missing  female  penis? Hadamard also  confides  that he makes many  errors  in writing. Hadamard himself then  quotes  H.J.  Poincaré’s œuvre  as  confirmation  of  what  has  been  said,  which, amongst other  things,  is mainly  centred on visual  representations.  In any  case,  all the  Poincaré  philosophical  thought  is  a  confirmation  of  what  here  has  been discussed  about  symbolization  and  creativity.  Also,  psychological  anthropology confirms a certain influence of visual perception on culture (see Bourguignon, 1979; and  references  therein).  Finally,  the  latest  neuroscience  researches  (see  Mancia, 2007)  say  that  the  first memory,  from neonatal  to about  the  first  three‐four years old,  is  the  implicit one, roughly  localized  in the subcortical areas, which  is not of a repressive nature.  Indeed,  the repressive contents are due to the action of explicit memory,  which  takes  place  when  the  cortical  areas  are  well  developed,  since  its neural circuits are mostly localized there. The implicit memory has, then, essentially somatic‐emotive  origins  and  accomplishes  to  the  presymbolic  and  preverbal attitudes.  It will play a very  fundamental  role  in  the next psychic evolution of  the individual.  Finally,  take  into  account  the  cerebral  localization  both  of  the  visual stimuli and of the sensory‐motor ones.   50 In this regard, we have the above‐mentioned embodied mathematics (see Lakoff & Núñez,  2000)  conception,  which  receives  further  validation  by  the  recent experimental work by the neuroscientist A. R. Damasio, according to whom somatic experiences  play  a  fundamental  role  in  the  formation  of  human  thought  and  its developments. On the other hand, all  that  is coherent with the slow maturation of the  nervous  reticular  system which  inextricably  links  together  the  peripheral  and the central nervous systems (see Oliverio, 1982). 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component elements together with their meaning (semantics) in dependence on the reality 
test (pragmatics). As is widely described above, during this corporal image formation the 
agency Ideal Ego and the agency system Ego’s Ideal – Super-Ego are mainly involved 
together with their psychodynamic mechanisms.  
 
Further considerations on creativity and all that 
On creativity: I. 
According to Carotenuto (1991), creativity is mainly an Ego’s function. Such a creative 
Ego’s function does not exclusively have a concrete character, that is to say, it does not 
consist uniquely in the production of concrete objects, but instead it may act in various 
other ways. The aims and objectives of libidinal drives are also shifted toward non-
personal objects which Phyllis Greenacre generically called collective alternatives (see 
above section). Fossi (1983), starting from the previous work of Greenacre51 (1953, 1957, 
1971), states that at the basis of creative thought lies the experience of childhood dismay 
felt by a creative individual, during her or his own infancy, with a very special emotional 
intensity.52 Such an experience would be related to the vision of a penis and with the 
features of the Œdipus phase, so that we have another confirmation of what is suggested 
in this paper. According to Greenacre, the psychosexual development of a creative person 
is quite different from that of any other normal person, so that the contact points between 
creative talent and neurotic or psychotic behaviour may exist, that is to say, such an 
incomplete psychic development cannot exclude predispositions to dissociation 
phenomena. In creative individuals, certain tendencies toward a precocious mysticism or 
religious experiences have also been detected, sometimes with identifications with divine 
figures, and this can again be explained by means of the disavowal mechanism because of 
the mystic meaning that the fetish may have. The gifted child sublimates strong erotic and 
aggressive instincts into a “loving affair with the world” of which he or she has an 
exalted vision, so that the creative thing is meant to be like a loving gift. Creativity 
expresses an endeavour to harmonize the external world (to which the individual 
responds in a hypersensitive manner) with the internal one, to gratify the own narcissistic 
needs and to overcome loneliness. According to Greenacre, the creative process does not 
use neutralized energy and it does not represent a function of the Ego agency (as stated 
above) free from conflicts. Instead, the creative mind often undergoes reactive formations 
which may promote symbolization phenomena. The adult creative individual is subjected 
                                                51 Already widely mentioned above. En passant,  following Harley and Weil  (1990) and Scull and Schulkin (2009), we recall that Phyllis Greenacre (1894‐1989) was a notable American psychiatrist (with A. Meyer as advisor) and a psychoanalyst (with F.  Wittels  and  E.  Jacobson  as  supervisors),  in  friendship  with  E.  Kris  and  H. Hartmann,  who  made  important  clinical  and  theoretical  contributions  to  and insights  into  human  development,  to  psychoanalytic  training  and  therapy,  and  to creativity and fetishism.  In particular, in  the early 1950s Greenacre began to write on  fetishism, observing that  fetishists had an especially mutable bodily  image. The notable  fact  that descriptions of bodily  changes were  central  to  the works both of the  writer,  mathematician  and  logician  Lewis  Carroll  and  of  the  writer  Jonathan Swift  led  to  the psychoanalytic‐biographical  study  (Greenacre, 1955)  in which  she made a psychodynamic study of the creative thought of these authors on the basis of her ideas on creativity and fetishism. 52 See also Rycroft (1968a). 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to a continuous conflict, to an incomplete repression, to an unusual re-entry to childhood 
fantasies, to great availability of non-neutralized libidinal and aggressive energetic 
quantity. The latter continuously oscillates between primary and secondary processes, 
although the creative activity is mainly the result of the primary process whose instinctual 
energy is displaced as a cathexis object and aim through elaboration by secondary 
process. Greenacre distinguishes between two possible main creative inspirations, the 
oral one and the Œdipus one, the latter being related to the resolution modalities of the 
Œdipus complex. Thus, also due to these last conclusions as well as to the different 
available sets of collective alternates and to the greater or lesser degree of conscious or 
preconscious attachment to the original object of libidinal drive, we have enough 
elements for a possible explanation of the detected minor degree of creativity in women 
compared to men. In Greenacre (1971), the author argues on some important studies 
made by her on the nature of inspiration in relation to the phallic phase, which we have 
already discussed in the previous section. In particular, she points out the importance 
played by some significant screen memories and particular events that occurred during 
the transition from the phallic to the Œdipus phase. In short, she reports some clinical 
cases treated by her and related to gifted persons with a great imaginative component, all 
joined by some recurrent common themes mainly linked to primary scenes, recounted as 
screen memories, above all related to penis envy for females and to a general reverential 
awe for penis, prodromal to later castration feelings. All the examined subjects showed a 
great imagination, a sensual sensitivity to light, colours and nature, hence a deep interest 
in and curiosity for the external world in which they look for the reflection of their 
sentiments. According to Greenacre, the inspiration experiences of childhood (named 
phallic experiences) are the prototype of any other inspiration. In any case, human 
thought ever recalls the somatic or corporal experience which has created it, whose 
physical sensations will be imaginatively projected in symbolic forms according to 
modalities which are predisposed during the phallic and Œdipus phases. Furthermore, 
Phyllis Greenacre detected a particular predisposition, above all amongst scientists, to a 
sort of mystic relationship toward a God, mostly not related to that of religion, 
representing that mysterious impulse that gives the creative force who they have. 
Greenacre would want to bring back such a God to the father of the familiar romance (of 
the Œdipus phase) as lived by the individual. All that, from the point of view of the 
present paper, could also be linked to the symbolic role played by fetish in mythology 
and religion, as briefly recalled in the previous section. In this regard, it is noteworthy to 
recall the 1928 work Dostoevsky and Parricide in which Freud proposed interpreting the 
hysteroepilepsy of the writer as being due to the strong anguish of his father’s threats. 
According to Greenacre (1971), certain perverse characterial profiles are present above 
all in creative personalities, often hidden behind forms of isolation.  
 
On creativity: II  
Creative thought, with the symbolic function as a result of the disavowal mechanism, has 
strong instinctive needs that the external reality is not able to satisfy, differently from the 
fetishist who instead finds, in a partial material object (fetish), a rough satisfaction with 
them. So, the creative person turns her or his attention towards the fantasy world where 
he or she finds a surrogate to the satisfaction of her or his own desires. Likewise to 
neurotics and psychotics, the creative mind is cut out from the reality, but is different 
from it because he or she may come back to the reality since this is not precluded from 
him or her. This is explainable through the disavowal mechanism because this is mainly 
based on the chief fact that a real fact (the awareness of gender sexual difference, namely 
 Language and Psychoanalysis, 2013, 2 (2), 121-160 
http://dx.doi.org/10.7565/landp.2013.009 
 
153 
the detected lack of a female penis) is, however, always perceived but disavowed, 
displacing such real but painful perception to the symbolic realm in normal cases, 
whereas, in degenerate cases, it is displaced to a material fetish object. Again, following 
Carotenuto (1991), the well-known writer Joseph Conrad seemed to have strong fetishist 
problems according to a psychoanalytic biography written by Meyer (1967). According 
to Eissler (1962; 1967), who made some interesting psychoanalytical remarks on 
Leonardo da Vinci and his work in Meyer (1967), psychopathology is an indispensable 
element for certain types of higher mental conquests; in this regard, see also Andreasen 
(2008) and Janka (2004). Finally, as stated above, the remarkable work of Greenacre 
(1955) is on two creative persons, the writer Jonathan Swift (1667-1745) and the 
mathematician and writer Lewis Carroll (1832-1898). At the basis of their creative 
thought, Greenacre identifies a disorder of bodily image, hence forms of fetishism. The 
whole Part II of the fundamental treatise by Carotenuto (1991) is fully devoted to the 
creative dimension of human thought, and most of what is reported there is easily 
explainable through the simple psychodynamic model considered here and mainly based 
on the disavowal mechanism. All this might turn out to be of a certain usefulness to 
confirm what we suggest. In particular, we have widely made reference to the remarkable 
work of Phyllis Greenacre. She began to be interested in perversions and creativity from 
the 1950s. Her main idea is that fetishism is chiefly the outcome of an imperfect 
development of the corporal image. She deepened fetishism in relation to Winnicott’s 
transitional object theory, whereupon, Greenacre was naturally led towards creativity: as 
she herself said, this interest in creativity was due to the influence of Ernst Kris and to her 
previous work on fetishism. In that period, Greenacre was engaged in studying the 
celebrated Lewis Carroll work Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, under the strong and 
stimulating advice of Kris. To be precise, in studying fetishism and similar disorders, she 
noticed the recurrent presence of sentiments of change of corporal image together with 
tendencies to identify and personalize different parts of the body. At the same time, 
Greenacre was also studying the above work of Carroll as well as Jonathan Swift’s 
Gulliver’s Travels, finding confirmation of what she had noticed, namely that in fairy 
tales and popular stories there were descriptions similar to the features of fetishism of 
above, so that she began to study the biographies of these authors, which led her to the 
basic work (Greenacre, 1955). In this way, fetishism and creativity met during the fruitful 
and notable work of Phyllis Greenacre, a route also followed successfully by Chasseguet-
Smirgel (1985).   
 
Conclusions 
Finally, we summarize what points of this paper, from our point of view, deserve major 
attention. On the basis of the fetishism pattern as explained by the last 1938 Freudian 
thought, and taking into account the disavowal mechanism considered to be, d’après 
Anna Freud and Laplanche and Pontalis (1973), a general psychic mechanism involved in 
a basic Ego’s splitting which gives rise to two main subagencies (Ideal Ego and Ego’s 
Ideal according to H. Numberg and D. Lagache), it is possible to reach the basis of the 
first very basic symbolic functions by means of the separation of opposites operated by 
the dialectic interaction between the above Ego’s subagencies.53 To be precise, it is the 
                                                53  These  two  Ego’s  subagencies  related  to  the  Ego’s  idealization  are  also  closely connected with the  formation of primary and secondary narcissism,  the  first being related to Ideal Ego, the second to the system Ego’s Ideal – Super‐Ego. Therefore, the dialectic relation between all these Ego’s subagencies is connected with narcissism. 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dualistic interaction between the Ideal Ego subagency, mainly related to primary 
narcissism, and the subagency system Ego’s Ideal – Super-Ego, mainly related to 
secondary narcissism, that gives rise to that complex, interrelated and variegated realm of 
non-conventional and conventional symbols. At the same time, starting from the Freudian 
assumption of the polymorphous nature of a child (which might justify a kind of 
ubiquitous nature of childish fetishism in infancy), this Ego’s splitting gives rise as well 
both to symbolic and imaginative elaborations (as in normal cases, marking the passage 
from nature to culture, including the language) or to degenerations (as in pathological 
cases of paraphilia). These two alternatives are not completely disjunctive of each other, 
but always in dialectic interaction between them, with a prevalence of one on the other. It 
is also possible to understand symbolic or imaginative elaborations in a wider sense, 
including too neuroses and psychoses, but whose relations with reality are quite different 
from those related to the remaining normal forms of symbolic elaborations like those 
involved in natural sciences. As recalled by Laplanche and Pontalis (1973), and as widely 
mentioned above, the two different psychic attitudes resulting from the Ego’s splitting, 
contrary and independent of each other, are at the foundation of the person’s 
psychoanalytic theory itself. Furthermore, having to do with an intrasystemic Ego’s 
splitting rather than with an agency splitting (for instance between Ego and Id), Freud 
wished to stress a new psychic mechanism different from repression and negation. 
Indeed, the main feature of this division process is just that it does not reach the 
formation of a (synthetic) compromise between these opposite attitudes, but rather it 
keeps or maintains both simultaneously without establishing between them any dialectic 
relationships. In doing so, that is to say, in contemporaneously maintaining, at the same 
level, opposite or contrasting tendencies or attitudes, it will be possible to have that 
syncretic character,54 unifying and globalizing, that will allow a symbolic function, in 
accordance with its original etymological meaning. As stated in Part 1, during the passage 
from the anal phase to the phallic one, ambivalence gradually reaches its higher value in 
the sense that, in it, the opposite tendencies lie at the same level, that is, they hold next to 
one another, this being a characterizing element for symbolic formation. In any case, the 
symbolic function would be closely related to the outcomes of the disavowal mechanism 
and then ruled by the various qualitative and quantitative dialectic relationships between 
these two Ego’s sub-agencies,55 established bit by bit during psychosexual development. 
In particular, in doing so, it would be possible to provide some psychodynamic 
motivation to mathematical symbolism in relation to natural science in the cognitive 
model of G. Lakoff and R.E. Núñez, based on the notion of conceptual metaphor. 
Furthermore, from what has been said in the paper, it is possible to put forward the 
hypothesis according to which there may be a gender difference in the formation of 
bodily image during the first four years of age, which, in turn, reflect different abilities in 
visual-spatial skills that, as said, are of fundamental importance for mathematical 
                                                                                                                                       On  the  other  hand,  in  relation  to  what  has  been  pursued  in  this  paper,  the narcissistic  character  of  mathematicians  is  well  known,  since  K. Weierstrass  and Novalis’s  semi‐philosophical  considerations  on  mathematics  (see  Dyck,  1960; Jahnke,  1991)  according  to  which  ‘’a  real  mathematician  is  an  enthusiast  per  se; 
without enthusiasm, there is no mathematics’’, as was well testified by Fine and Fine (1977). 54 See Iurato (2012) and also Iurato (2013). 55 Most human psychic functioning will be ruled by the basically dualistic interplay between the system Ego’s Ideal‐Super‐Ego subagencies and the Ideal Ego subagency with their relations with Id. 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attitudes, above all the algebraic-geometrical ones. On the other hand, for every creative 
artist, no one moment of her or his life is more happy and rewarding than the one leading 
to a discovery or invention thanks to which the artist may finally appease her or his 
original castration anguish by means of this symbolic satisfaction, thereby refinding the 
female penis lack. Finally, as we have said at the beginning of the first part of this paper, 
the above-mentioned Ego’s splitting is also at the basis of the bodily image formation 
with related phenomena (like transitional object phenomena, etc.) on which, in turn, the 
first syntactic and semantic formations of human thought rely, prodromal patterns upon 
which further relations between mathematics and physics will be moulded.  
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